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Articles 
CONTESTED SHORE: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
RECLAIMED LAND AND THE BATTLE  
FOR STREETERVILLE 
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill 
ABSTRACT—Land reclaimed from navigable waters is a resource uniquely 
susceptible to conflict. The multiple reasons for this include traditional 
hostility to interference with navigable waterways and the weakness of 
rights in submerged land. In Illinois, title to land reclaimed from Lake 
Michigan was further clouded by a shift in judicial understanding in the 
late nineteenth century about who owned the submerged land, starting with 
an assumption of private ownership but eventually embracing state 
ownership. The potential for such legal uncertainty to produce conflict is 
vividly illustrated by the history of the area of Chicago known as 
Streeterville, the area of reclaimed land along Lake Michigan north of the 
Chicago River and east of Michigan Avenue. Beginning in the 1850s, 
Streeterville was subject to repeated waves of litigation, assertions of 
squatters’ rights (most notably by George Wellington Streeter, for whom 
the area is named), conspiracies to obtain federal land grants based on 
veterans’ rights, schemes in reliance on claims of Native Americans, and a 
public works project designed to secure the claims of wealthy riparian 
owners. The riparian owners eventually won the many-sided battle, but 
only after convincing institutions such as Northwestern University to build 
substantial structures on the land. The history of Streeterville suggests that 
when legal title to reclaimed land is highly uncertain, conflict over control 
of the land is likely to persist until one or more persons succeed in 
establishing what is perceived to be possession of the land. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The history of Chicago suggests that reclaimed land—that is, land 
artificially created where water once stood—is a resource uniquely prone to 
conflict. This Article recounts a particular multisided dispute over 
reclaimed land in the Chicago neighborhood called Streeterville.1 The land 
in question was created by a combination of natural accretion, unauthorized 
landfilling, and a legally sanctioned public works project. The result was 
great uncertainty about who had title to the new terra firma. This 
uncertainty over property rights ignited a struggle lasting decades that 
featured not only litigation and special interest legislation but also fraud 
and outright violence. 
The battle over property rights in Streeterville can be divided into 
three periods. The first, which lasted from roughly 1850 to 1885, was 
relatively decorous, consisting largely of litigation over rights to land 
formed by natural accretion. The second, from roughly 1885 to 1915, was 
intense and largely extralegal. This period included, most famously, gun 
battles between the followers of the notorious squatter, George Wellington 
Streeter, and private guards hired by wealthy Chicago landowners who 
 
1 “Streeterville” is an informal name given to an area of Chicago, just north of the Chicago River, 
whose boundaries are somewhat imprecise. For general purposes in this Article, we regard Streeterville 
as encompassing the area north of the Chicago River and south of Oak Street that lay beneath Lake 
Michigan when Chicago was originally founded as a city. This makes St. Clair Street roughly the 
western border of the area. 
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claimed title to the area based on riparian rights. This period also featured a 
conspiracy to secure the land using scrip given to the survivors of a 
Mexican War hero and a scheme to claim the land for a branch of the 
Potawatomi Indians, who had occupied the area before white settlers 
arrived. The third period, from roughly 1915 to 1930, was when the 
wealthy landowners who claimed the land by riparian rights consolidated 
their control over the area, abetted by construction of structures by 
institutions of impeccable social standing, most notably Northwestern 
University. 
One question raised by the history of Streeterville is why it took so 
long for the struggle over the newly formed land to be resolved. The 
answer would seem to be that as long as the reclaimed land stood vacant, it 
remained, in the minds of many, a resource that was up for grabs—and as 
long as it was perceived as being up for grabs, competition to establish 
property rights in the land continued. This competition, in turn, discouraged 
development of the land, which meant that it remained vacant and hence 
continued to be perceived as being up for grabs. The matter was resolved 
only when the claimants with the most resources started to build substantial 
structures on the reclaimed land. This eliminated the perception that the 
land was open to capture and instead fostered an understanding that it was 
no different from other solid land that was actively possessed. 
Another question posed by the history of Streeterville is why the 
reclaimed land in this area of the City is overwhelmingly held in private 
ownership, whereas the reclaimed land south of the Chicago River, in what 
is now Grant Park, is public. The public trust doctrine, which arose out of 
conflict over control of filled land in the area of Grant Park, is not the 
explanation.2 The public trust doctrine applied to the reclaimed land in both 
areas but was found by the Illinois Supreme Court to pose no barrier to the 
grant of private ownership rights in Streeterville.3 The main reason for the 
difference rather is that Grant Park—as well as Lincoln Park to the north 
and Burnham Park to the south—came to be actively controlled by public 
entities such as the Chicago Park District. Reclaimed land that is actively 
monitored by a public entity can suppress the perception that the land is up 
for grabs. Such public control came late to Streeterville and applied only to 
the outer perimeter formed by Lake Shore Drive and associated public 
walkways and beaches, as we shall describe. By the time public control of 
the perimeter was established, private ownership of the interior had been 
secured by private development. Grant Park was also protected by a public 
dedication promising that the land in that area was “for ever to remain 
 
2 See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public 
Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004) (providing an 
overview of the public trust doctrine and its origins in controversies involving land in modern-day 
Grant Park). 
3 See People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 152–53, 45 N.E. 830, 835 (1896). 
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vacant of buildings.”4 This public dedication was vigorously enforced by 
abutting private landowners, most notably Montgomery Ward.5 No such 
public dedication restricted development in Streeterville. 
We begin in Part I by considering general background conditions that 
promote uncertainty about the ownership of reclaimed land, together with 
factors aggravating this uncertainty in Illinois in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. We then trace, in Parts II–VI, the history of 
Streeterville, from its origins as Kinzie’s Addition in the 1830s, through the 
period of natural accretion, to Streeter’s efforts to establish squatters’ 
rights, to the conspiracies associated with the McKee scrip and Potawatomi 
claims, to the efforts of the wealthy riparian owners to secure rights 
through the auspices of the Lincoln Park Commission. Part VII describes 
how the apparent victory of the riparian owners in the Kirk decision of 
1896 failed to end the contestation over property rights, which persisted 
into the 1920s. Finally, Part VIII argues that the legal uncertainty ended 
only with the construction of substantial structures on the reclaimed land, 
including Northwestern’s Chicago campus. 
I. UNCERTAIN PROPERTY RIGHTS IN RECLAIMED LAND 
Uncertainty about property rights in Streeterville was partially a 
function of certain features that are common to reclaimed land everywhere. 
The uncertainty was aggravated by factors that applied with particular force 
to Illinois in the second half of the nineteenth century. We begin in section 
A with the features common to reclaimed land generally and then turn in 
sections B and C to the Illinois-specific factors. 
A. Weak Property Rights in Submerged Land 
One reason rights to reclaimed land are uncertain is that property 
rights in submerged land—the substratum on which such reclaimed land 
rests—are weak. With respect to solid land, no one questions that soil or 
structures added to the land belong to the owner of the solid land.6 In 
contrast, when soil or other fill is added to submerged land, there is no 
equivalent understanding that the reclaimed land automatically belongs to 
the owner of the submerged land. Why the difference? 
 
4 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, Private Rights in Public Lands: The Chicago 
Lakefront, Montgomery Ward, and the Public Dedication Doctrine, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1417, 1426–27 
(2011) (detailing the history, means, and extent of the preservation of the land in modern-day Grant 
Park as open space). 
5 See id. at 1464–1500. 
6 This is a function of the ad coelum doctrine, short for cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum et 
ad inferos (he who owns the soil owns to the sky and to the depths), which is in turn a manifestation of 
the general principle of accession. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original 
Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 467 (2009) (providing an overview of the doctrine). 
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Property rights in submerged land are weak in significant part because 
of the strong public interest in the water that lies above the submerged land. 
The water itself—certainly if it is navigable—has always been regarded as 
an open-access resource. From Roman times to English common law to the 
present, navigable waters have been regarded as a resource that should be 
kept open to the general public for travel by boat or for fishing.7 In modern 
times, recreational uses (e.g., swimming or rafting) and so-called 
ecosystem services (e.g., habitat for waterfowl or spawning grounds for 
fish) have been added to the list of public interests in bodies of water.8 If 
these interests are to be protected, submerged land must not be developed 
in ways that would interfere with public values. To take the most obvious 
example, submerged land should not be divided into multiple parcels 
having exclusion rights in the overflowing water, since this would create 
impossible transaction-cost barriers for those wishing to use the water for 
navigation or fishing.9 
Property rights in submerged land are also weak because of certain 
physical attributes of the resource. Submerged land is typically unoccupied 
and undeveloped. It is also invisible in most circumstances—it is masked 
by the water, which ordinarily does not permit observation of the land from 
the surface. Because it is normally unoccupied and invisible, it is difficult 
to determine if it has been disturbed or invaded. Indeed, the traditional 
assumption about submerged land—which is still the law with respect to 
the deep seas beyond the exclusive economic zone—is that it is not owned 
or possessed by anyone.10 Like the water above it, submerged land is 
commonly assumed to be an open-access resource or commons. This 
undoubtedly remains the public perception even with respect to submerged 
land near the shore or under inland lakes. 
The weakness of property rights in submerged land is revealed when 
particular economic values associated with that land become salient, such 
as a desire to harvest shellfish from the submerged land, or to salvage a 
sunken vessel and its cargo, or to drill for oil and gas below the seabed. The 
invisibility of submerged land and the associated difficulty of establishing 
secure property rights in such land mean that competitive races often break 
out when such values emerge. Indeed, competitions are common with 
 
7 For good historical surveys, see Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An 
Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976), and Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in 
the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That 
Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511 (1975). 
8 See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 8:20, at 482–84 (Rowan Seidel 
& Barbara J. Hagen eds., 2012). 
9 See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1382 (1993). 
10 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 57–58, 60, 89, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994); H.J.W. COULSON & URQUHART 
A. FORBES, THE LAW RELATING TO WATERS, SEA, TIDAL, AND INLAND 2, 13–14 (2d ed. 1902). 
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respect to sunken vessels,11 rights to oyster beds,12 and rights to drill for oil 
and gas.13 
The legal doctrines that apply when some Act of God such as a storm 
or flood causes new land to appear or disappear also reveal the relative 
weakness of property rights in submerged lands. From Roman times to the 
present, a distinction has been recognized between gradual and 
imperceptible changes to shorelines and sudden and perceptible changes.14 
Both types of changes can be seen as presenting a conflict between the 
owner of the submerged land and the owner of the adjacent riparian land. 
Gradual and imperceptible changes—accretion, erosion, and 
reliction—augment or diminish the rights of the owner of the adjacent 
riparian land. What is particularly significant about these doctrines, for 
present purposes, is that the riparian owner is regarded as the one having 
the most significant connection to any new land. In terms of the principle 
of accession—which includes accretion (gradual accumulation of land) and 
reliction (gradual recession of water)15—the existing solid land, where 
possession is already securely established, is regarded as the prominent 
asset to which the new resource attaches. The submerged land, where 
ownership is not associated with any actual occupation and is invisible, has 
a much weaker claim on the new resource.16 
Changes that are sudden and perceptible, called avulsions, do not 
result in any modification of property boundaries.17 If a large chunk of land 
suddenly washes away in a hurricane, the boundary remains as it was 
before, although some of the riparian owner’s land is now submerged. 
Similarly, if a river suddenly breaks through an oxbow, isolating a parcel of 
 
11 See, e.g., Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499 (1861). In modern times, the competition for wrecks is 
likely to pit salvors against governments, which have taken to claiming wrecks based on sovereign 
ownership of the vessels or the submerged land in which they are found. See, e.g., Odyssey Marine 
Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
federal court lacked admiralty jurisdiction over a wreck discovered by a salvage company, given 
evidence submitted by the government of Spain that it was a military vessel). 
12 See, e.g., BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND 
ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY 135–37 (1998). 
13 See, e.g., ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 91–93, 
101–03 (Palgrave MacMillan, 2d ed. 2004) (1986) (recounting the conflict over allocation of rights to 
North Sea oil and how that allocation deviated from the legal rights to submerged land reflected in 
international law). 
14 See Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 
23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305 (2010) (tracing the history of the distinction and its reception in American 
law). 
15 See TARLOCK, supra note 8, § 3:44, at 84–85; Merrill, supra note 6, at 465–66. 
16 Where accession operates, “small objects become accessions to great ones, and not great to 
small.” 1 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 328 n.75 (David Fate Norton & Mary 
J. Norton eds., Clarendon Press 2007) (1739). For a modern account couched in terms of game theory, 
see SUGDEN, supra note 13. 
17 See Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 361 (1892) (and authorities cited). 
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land from its previous owner, the parcel continues to belong to whoever 
owned it before. By and large, however, the doctrine of avulsion, like the 
doctrine of accretion, privileges the owner of existing solid land relative to 
the owner of submerged land. Ownership of solid land, which typically has 
been actively possessed, is not lost by sudden and perceptible acts of 
nature. Nor does the owner of submerged land gain a windfall through such 
events. 
What about additions to solid land brought about by artificial filling? 
Artificial filling is obviously different in important respects from changes 
to the shoreline produced by Acts of God. Awarding title to artificially 
filled land to the riparian owner would create a serious moral hazard. 
Riparian owners would have a powerful incentive to augment their 
holdings by filling, even at the expense of public rights in open waters and 
free navigation. Consequently, courts have long assumed that riparian 
owners who engage in deliberate filling of submerged land, or who erect 
structures in the water that cause their land to be augmented by accretion, 
cannot claim title to the new land.18 
Who then owns artificially created land? The logic of the accretion–
avulsion distinction suggests that such land should belong to the owner of 
the submerged land. If someone dumps enough dirt on submerged land to 
cause it to turn to solid land, the change will be sudden and perceptible, and 
thus should be classified as an avulsion. If such artificial avulsions are 
treated like other avulsions for purposes of title, then title should remain as 
it was before the change took place—that is, with the owner of the 
submerged land. There is some authority supporting this analysis. In Stop 
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection,19 for example, the Supreme Court concluded that Florida law 
could be construed as allowing the owner of submerged land (the State of 
Florida, as it happened) to engage in artificial filling on submerged land to 
create an expanded public beach, because this would be regarded under 
Florida law as an artificial avulsion.20 
Nevertheless, there are relatively few cases that explicitly treat 
deliberate filling as an artificial avulsion.21 And the precedents that do exist, 
including Stop the Beach, admit of unease about the result.22 Perhaps this is 
because allowing the owner of the submerged land to engage in 
unrestricted artificial filling as an incident of its ownership of such land 
 
18 See, e.g., Lovingston v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 64 Ill. 56, 65 (1872), aff’d, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 
(1874) (riparian owner can claim accretions caused by erection of artificial structure, but only if the 
structure was made by some third party on other land); Brundage v. Knox, 279 Ill. 450, 466, 117 N.E. 
123, 128 (1917) (to similar effect). 
19 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).  
20 See id. at 2611–12. 
21 See 3 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 2485–86 (1904). 
22 See, e.g., 130 S. Ct. at 2612 (describing the result as “odd” and “counter-intuitive”). 
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could interfere with public rights of navigation and fishing. And even if the 
owner of the submerged land (commonly but not universally the state) is 
mindful of public rights, filling submerged land can interfere with the 
private rights of riparian owners by blocking access to the water or 
impairing other riparian rights such as the right to view the water. Perhaps 
in part for these reasons, the federal government—through the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers—has been given regulatory authority over any 
dredging and filling of navigable waters; this authority acts as a trump of 
state property rights in submerged land.23 
As a matter of historical practice, the treatment of artificial filling has 
been far from uniform or clear. We know that many states permitted or 
even encouraged artificial filling and often awarded newly formed landfill 
to abutting riparian owners.24 It is also probable that surreptitious filling has 
been tolerated as a way of augmenting riparian land, if only because it is 
difficult to detect and prevent. In short, although the logic of the common 
law distinction between accretion and avulsion would seem to award title to 
land created by artificial filling to the owner of the submerged land on 
which the fill is placed, the actual treatment of such conduct has been 
mixed, creating significant uncertainty about the legal status of artificially 
filled land. 
B. A Changing Baseline of Title to Submerged Land 
The uncertainties that generally afflict reclaimed land were heightened 
in Illinois in the late nineteenth century by shifting legal understandings 
about who held legal title to the submerged land beneath Lake Michigan. 
Here it is important to trace some background about the evolution of 
American law concerning ownership of land under navigable waters. 
In English law, an important distinction was maintained between 
navigable and non-navigable waters. With respect to navigable waters, the 
King was said to own the submerged lands, subject to the rights of all 
subjects to navigate and to fish.25 In effect, the land was subject to a public 
servitude for navigation and fishing. When the American colonies declared 
their independence, they were held to succeed to the rights of the Crown in 
 
23 See Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006); Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1344 (2006) (allowing the Secretary of the Army, acting 
through the Chief of Engineers, to issue permits “for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the 
navigable waters at specified disposal sites”). 
24 See, e.g., HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870, at 44–68 (1983); TARLOCK, supra note 8, 
§ 8:25, at 492–93. 
25 See Lord Mathew Hale, De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem, in 1 A COLLECTION OF TRACTS 
RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND, FROM MANUSCRIPTS 5, 6–7 (Dublin, Francis Hargrave ed., 1787). 
Technically, English law recognized only a presumption that lands beneath tidal waters belonged to the 
King. If one could produce a written grant clearly conveying the land to a private party, the grant would 
be upheld. In practice, this meant only that the land was not inalienable. 
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this respect. So the state governments were deemed to own the lands 
beneath navigable waters, again subject to the two historical public rights.26 
In 1845, the Supreme Court held that newly formed states carved out of the 
federal public domain were entitled to these same rights of ownership with 
respect to submerged lands beneath navigable waters.27 This came to be 
known as the “equal footing” doctrine: the new states stood on an equal 
footing with the original states in terms of their ownership of submerged 
lands.28 
There was a complication. English law, at least as understood by 
American commentators, defined “navigable waters” to mean waters 
subject to the ebb and flow of the tides.29 This made sense in the English 
context, with its long coastline and short rivers, most of which were tidal in 
the reaches where commercial traffic was important. So, in England, the 
Crown was deemed to be the owner of submerged lands beneath tidal 
waters—but submerged land under rivers, lakes, and ponds not washed by 
the tides was owned by the abutting riparian landowner to the centerline of 
the body of water.30 This set of understandings can be called the “English 
rule” for ownership of submerged lands under non-navigable waters.31 
America, unlike England, contained many long rivers and large 
internal lakes that were not tidal and yet were critical to interstate 
commerce. So the English definition of navigable waters did not make 
sense in the American context. The Supreme Court eventually recognized 
this: it held—initially only for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction—that 
“navigable” in the United States means navigable in fact.32 The Court also 
eventually held that “navigable” means navigable in fact for purposes of 
the equal footing doctrine.33 But there was a wrinkle, and it was to 
contribute to confusion over rights to submerged lands. With respect to 
waters that were navigable in fact, the equal footing doctrine meant that 
each state was free to decide for itself how to determine title to land 
 
26 See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410–18 (1842). 
27 See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228–29 (1845). 
28 See James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public 
Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 34–36 (1997). 
29 See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: “Navigability” and the Transformation of the 
Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1083–90 (2002) (expressing some 
skepticism about whether the American commentators got English law right). 
30 See JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW IN RELATION TO WATER-COURSES 
14–18 (Boston, Wells & Lilly 1824); 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 528–29 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 9th ed. 1858). 
31 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 828. 
32 See Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851). 
33 See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435–37 (1892). 
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beneath such waters.34 In effect, each state could choose whether to 
embrace the English view of submerged land ownership with respect to 
such lands or, instead, what could be called the American rule, which 
awarded title to land under waters that were navigable in fact to the state 
government.35 
The resulting understanding of the equal footing doctrine has 
generated a confusing pastiche of rules in the United States about who 
owns submerged lands. The doctrine means, for example, that where a 
navigable river forms the boundary between two states, the submerged land 
on one side of the centerline of the river can belong to the state while on 
the other side a private party owns title to the submerged land.36 
Nor is there any requirement of internal consistency, as is illustrated 
by the law in Illinois. The state courts in Illinois initially applied the 
English rule to land beneath navigable rivers, including the Mississippi, 
Ohio, and Chicago Rivers.37 Riparian owners whose land bordered Lake 
Michigan had every reason to believe that the English rule for establishing 
ownership of submerged land would apply to them, too. Although there 
was no definitive decision to this effect, the behavior of legally advised 
parties such as the City of Chicago and the Illinois Central Railroad was 
consistent with this understanding.38 Starting in 1860, however, the Illinois 
Supreme Court began inching toward the American rule, at least for Lake 
Michigan and other large lakes. In that year, the court interpreted a deed 
that described the boundary of property as “Lake Michigan” to mean that 
ownership extended only to the edge of the lake.39 Soon, lawyers began 
advising owners of riparian property on Lake Michigan that they had no 
claim to the bed of the lake.40 For a time, it was unclear who did own it: 
The federal government? The State? The unorganized public? Although the 
result was foreshadowed in earlier federal decisions,41 it was not until 1896 
that the Illinois Supreme Court definitively ruled that the State owned the 
 
34 In other words, federal law controlled as to whether waters were navigable, but state law 
controlled as to the ownership of submerged land under waters that were navigable. See Packer v. Bird, 
137 U.S. 661, 666–70 (1891); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 40 (1894). 
35 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 828‒29. 
36 See Louisiana v. Mississippi, 466 U.S. 96, 98 (1984). 
37 See Middleton v. Pritchard, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 510, 518–22 (1842) (a riparian owner on the 
Mississippi holds title to the bed of the river to the centerline); Ensminger v. People, 47 Ill. 384, 388–92 
(1868) (noting the same rule for the Ohio River); City of Chicago v. Laflin, 49 Ill. 172, 176 (1868) 
(applying the same rule for the Chicago River). 
38 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 830, 837. 
39 See Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521, 525 (1860); see also Trs. of Sch. v. Schroll, 120 Ill. 509, 12 
N.E. 243 (1887) (applying rule to a different lake). 
40 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 833 n.153. 
41 See, e.g., Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 33 F. 730, 755–57 (N.D. Ill. 1888), aff’d, 146 U.S. 387 
(1892). 
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land beneath Lake Michigan.42 In other words, Illinois eventually decided 
to follow the English rule for rivers and the American rule for Lake 
Michigan. 
Whatever the merits and demerits of the state ownership doctrine, 
adoption of this understanding of title unquestionably added to uncertainty 
about who controls land created where water once stood. In previous 
writing, we have described how the tectonic shift in Illinois law from the 
English to the American rule with respect to title to the bed of Lake 
Michigan unleashed intense competition to claim the submerged land on 
the lakefront in Chicago. In the late 1860s, multiple groups attempted to 
secure legislation from the State transferring ownership of the submerged 
land to themselves, for purposes of constructing a new outer harbor in the 
lake.43 The competition was won by the Illinois Central Railroad, which 
secured such a grant in 1869, only to have it repealed in 1873.44 This led to 
litigation that was resolved only in 1902.45 Later, the state legislature 
authorized a massive project filling up the lakeshore in the area now known 
as Grant Park.46 This gave rise to an epic struggle over whether the newly 
created land would be used as a site for the construction of monumental 
buildings or as open space free of any substantial structures—a struggle 
that continues to this day.47 The reverberations from this shift in the law 
also fueled the disputes over ownership of filled land in Streeterville. 
C. The Weak State 
A third factor that contributed to uncertainty about rights to filled land 
was the weakness of the state as a political institution. Weak state 
governments, such as Illinois in the late nineteenth century, could easily be 
prevailed upon to convey rights to submerged lands.48 And when they 
retained title, they were unable to assert effective control over such lands. 
The states had no department of natural resources to monitor encroachment 
 
42 See People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 145–47, 45 N.E. 830, 833 (1896) (State owns 
the bed of Lake Michigan, distinguishing rule that applies to rivers); see also Fuller v. Shedd, 161 Ill. 
462, 44 N.E. 286 (1896) (holding that riparian owner abutting Wolf Lake owned only to the shore, not 
to the centerline). 
43 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 842–53, 860–77. 
44 See id. at 860–77, 905–12. 
45 See id. at 912–24. 
46 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1435–38. 
47 See id. at 1470–1517. 
48 See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 830, 837 (discussing conveyance by the State to the 
Illinois Central Railroad); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1437–38, 1479–80 (discussing grants by 
the State to the South Park Commissioners); infra Part VI (describing conveyance of submerged land by 
the State to the Lincoln Park Commissioners and through them to private riparian owners). 
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on submerged lands.49 All this, combined with legal uncertainty about 
ownership and control over these lands, invited machinations by private 
interests seeking to capture values associated with those lands. 
The relative weakness of the state governments in controlling rights to 
submerged lands is revealed by the evolution of another doctrine that 
affected the use and control of submerged lands: the privilege of riparian 
owners to “wharf out” to reach water deep enough to be accessible by boat. 
If the English rule of title to nontidal submerged land applies, then 
obviously a riparian owner can wharf out: such a riparian owner also owns 
the submerged land, and, so long as the wharf (or pier or dock) does not 
interfere with public rights of navigation, construction of the wharf is 
unproblematic.50 The more difficult case is where the state owns the 
submerged land—i.e., where the waters are tidal or are navigable in fact 
and the American rule of ownership applies. In these circumstances, many 
jurisdictions, following presumed English law, have held that a riparian 
owner still has the right to wharf out to the navigable portion of the water, 
provided that there is no interference with public navigation.51 This 
understanding made sense at a time when the state was weak and there 
were few public resources for the construction of wharfs and docks. Public 
access to transportation by water, in such circumstances, required private 
initiative. As government resources grew and governments increasingly 
began to sponsor construction of public wharfs and piers, many 
jurisdictions renounced the privilege to wharf out over publicly owned 
submerged lands.52 
The legal status of the wharfing-out privilege has always been unclear, 
which has given rise to further uncertainties when the government has 
moved to restrict the privilege. If the submerged land is owned by the state 
as sovereign, then one view is that the privilege is a mere license, and, 
under the doctrine of “purprestures,” the state can withdraw the privilege 
for any reason, or no reason at all.53 Another view is that the privilege is a 
species of riparian property rights and can be withdrawn only if the state 
proves that the wharf or dock is a public nuisance.54 This would typically 
 
49 Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 163–66 (1973) (describing the 
weakness of state institutions during the nineteenth century and providing an example of an Illinois 
ferry regulation that was left entirely to private citizens for its enforcement). 
50 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Laflin, 49 Ill. 172 (1868). 
51 See, e.g., Dutton v. Strong, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 23, 31–32 (1861); R.R. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 272, 286–89 (1868); Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504 (1870); see also 1 
FARNHAM, supra note 21, at 533 (discussing doctrine). 
52 See, e.g., Revell v. People, 177 Ill. 468, 486–89, 52 N.E. 1052, 1058–59 (1898); Oakland v. 
E. K. Wood Lumber Co., 211 Cal. 16, 22–23, 292 P. 1076, 1078–79 (1930) (per curiam); see also 
1 FARNHAM, supra note 21, at 544–45 (discussing Revell). 
53 See 1 FARNHAM, supra note 21, at 541; Alfred E. McCordic & Wilson G. Crosby, The Right of 
Access and the Right to Wharf Out to Navigable Water, 4 HARV. L. REV. 14, 19–21 (1890). 
54 See 1 FARNHAM, supra note 21, at 537–39. 
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entail a judicial finding that the wharf or dock interferes with rights 
common to the general public, such as navigation or fishing. The 
understanding of which rule applies has, once again, exhibited great 
instability. For example, New York went from being a purpresture state to 
being a public nuisance state, at roughly the same time that, in the late 
nineteenth century, Illinois went from being a public nuisance state to 
being a purpresture state.55 Most states today require a license from a 
governmental agency to build and maintain a dock or wharf; this represents 
a kind of intermediate position between the two polar positions that 
emerged at the end of the nineteenth century.56 
In short, the inherent weakness of property rights in submerged land, 
changing understandings about ownership of submerged land, and weak 
state institutions all converged in nineteenth-century Illinois to create 
conditions ripe for conflict among rival groups seeking to capture values 
associated with filled land. This, as we shall see, is a one-sentence 
explanation for what became the battle for Streeterville. 
II. KINZIE’S ADDITION 
Before Chicago became an organized community, it was a military fort 
and trading post. Beginning in 1803, the military outpost, Fort Dearborn, 
was located on the south bank of the Chicago River where Michigan 
Avenue is located today. Across the river, on the north bank, was a small 
farm and trading post belonging to one John Kinzie.57 Kinzie first came to 
the area in 1804, left during the War of 1812 when the fort was burned (and 
thirty-eight of its occupants were killed by Potawatomi Indians), and 
returned in 1816, when the fort was rebuilt.58 In 1821, a certain John Wall 
surveyed the area for the federal Public Land Office, following the 
rectangular grid system established by the Land Ordinance of 1785.59 
Wall’s hand-drawn map demarcated the area occupied by Kinzie’s farm as 
north fractional section 10, township 39 North, range 14 East, of the third 
principal meridian. He calculated that it contained 102.29 acres of land.60 
 
55 Compare Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y. 378, 85 N.E. 1093 (1908), with Revell, 
177 Ill. 468, 52 N.E. 1052. 
56 See 1 FARNHAM, supra note 21, at 550–51. 
57 For a history of Chicago from its earliest beginnings, see ULRICH DANCKERS & JANE MEREDITH, 
EARLY HISTORY OF CHICAGO (2000). 
58 See ANNE DURKIN KEATING, RISING UP FROM INDIAN COUNTRY: THE BATTLE OF FORT 
DEARBORN AND THE BIRTH OF CHICAGO 68–70, 146–50, 170–72, 187–88, 191–92, 209–22 (2012) 
(recounting Kinzie’s story in detail). 
59 See PAYSON JACKSON TREAT, THE NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM: 1785–1820, at 179–97 (1910) 
(providing a detailed examination of the Land Ordinance of 1785); see also BILL HUBBARD JR., 
AMERICAN BOUNDARIES: THE NATION, THE STATES, THE RECTANGULAR SURVEY 183–214 (2009) 
(summarizing the rectangular survey system in the Ordinance). 
60 See Edward O. Brown, The Shore of Lake Michigan, A Paper Read Before the Law Club of the 
City of Chicago 7–8 (Apr. 25, 1902) (recounting Wall’s survey). To view the survey itself, see Before 
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FIGURE 1: KINZIE’S CABIN61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1831, Robert A. Kinzie, John’s son, applied at the Land Office to 
make an entry on north fractional section 10 under the preemption acts, 
paying the statutory rate of $1.25 per acre.62 Two years later, the younger 
Kinzie subdivided the tract into lots and blocks and recorded a plat that 
came to be known as “Kinzie’s Addition” to the City of Chicago.63 The 
land so subdivided was bounded on the south by the Chicago River, on the 
east by Lake Michigan, on the west by Wolcott Street (which would later 
become State Street), and on the north by what would become Chicago 
Avenue. The street running north and south nearest the lake was called 
“Sand Street” (later renamed St. Clair Street); at approximately Huron 
Street (to the north) the shore of the lake bent to the west, at which point 
(largely between Huron and Superior streets and altogether before Chicago 
Avenue) Sand Street was cut off by the water.64 In 1837, the United States 
issued Robert Kinzie a patent conferring fee simple title to the tract and 
noting the acreage as stated on the 1821 survey. 
  
 
the Canal: Early History, BRIDGEPORT, https://www.uic.edu/orgs/LockZero/I.html (last visited Apr. 25, 
2013) [hereinafter Wall Survey]. 
61 On file with the Chicago History Museum DN-0001288. 
62 See Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 457 (1898). 
63 See Kinzie v. Winston, 56 Ill. 56, 59 (1870). 
64 See id. at 59–60; infra Figures 3, 6. 
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FIGURE 2: CHICAGO, INCLUDING KINZIE’S ADDITION (1834)65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
65 On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-37308. Kinzie’s Addition is the platted land in 
the upper right-hand corner of the map. 
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FIGURE 3: KINZIE’S ADDITION (1833)66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
66 Photograph courtesy of the Newberry Library, Chicago, Call No. map4F G4104 .C6A 18– .C6 
2010, sheet 5 of 8 (PrCt). 
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The natural barrier on the southern edge of Kinzie’s Addition, the 
Chicago River, was long recognized as having great potential as a port. It 
was, however, unusable for navigation in its natural state: a sand bar at its 
mouth caused the river to curve south and made the entrance too shallow 
for the ships that plied the Great Lakes.67 In 1833 and 1834, soldiers 
stationed at Fort Dearborn built piers on the north and south banks of the 
river, directing its flow straight into Lake Michigan. This alteration, 
supplemented by periodic dredging, turned the river into a functional port.68 
Chicago soon began its phenomenal growth as a city. Real estate values, 
including those in Kinzie’s Addition, rose dramatically, punctuated by 
occasional downturns during times of financial distress.69 
The current in the southern part of Lake Michigan generally moves in 
a counterclockwise direction.70 Though not anticipated when the mouth of 
the river was straightened by piers, this was to have a profound effect on 
the riparian lands to the immediate south and north. South of the river, the 
current caused irregular but persistent erosion of the shore. By the 1840s, 
the area then known as Lake Park (Grant Park today) had nearly washed 
away, and Michigan Avenue was in danger of collapsing into the lake.71 
After much wrangling, a solution was reached when the Illinois Central 
Railroad agreed to construct its rail line entering the City on piers in the 
lake, with a breakwater just outside the right of way, thereby protecting the 
shore against further erosion.72 
North of the river, the counterclockwise current generally led to 
accretion rather than erosion. As early as 1837, a chart labeled “Cap. 
Allen’s Map” (Figure 4 below), which was evidently prepared by an officer 
stationed at Fort Dearborn, indicated that the shoreline north of the river 
had moved outward into the lake from where it stood when the “work was 
commenced” (i.e., when the straightening of the river had occurred).73 The 
chart showed in this area two additional sandbars forming farther offshore, 
on a diagonal line running from the northwest to the southeast. The 1840s 
saw further accretion, so that soon an estimated 1200 feet of new land had 
augmented the original subdivision to the east of Sand Street. It was a gift 
of nature—new solid land formed on what had once been submerged land. 
 
67 See HAROLD M. MAYER, THE PORT OF CHICAGO AND THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY 9–11 (1957); 
supra Figure 2. 
68 See MAYER, supra note 67, at 10–11. 
69 See HOMER HOYT, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LAND VALUES IN CHICAGO 33–37 (Beard Books 
2000) (1933). 
70 See DOUGLAS SCHROEDER, THE ISSUE OF THE LAKEFRONT: AN HISTORICAL CRITICAL SURVEY 2 
(1964). 
71 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1428–29. 
72 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 817–20. 
73 HAROLD M. MAYER & RICHARD C. WADE, CHICAGO: GROWTH OF A METROPOLIS 16 fig.1 
(1969). 
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It was not long before legal maneuvering broke out over who had the right 
to capture the economic value associated with this new land. 
FIGURE 4: CAP. ALLEN’S MAP (1837)74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As we have seen, the doctrine of accretion provides that gradual and 
imperceptible deposits of new soil belong to the owner of the riparian land 
to which the soil attaches. Early decisions of the Illinois courts followed 
this recognized doctrine.75 The idea sounds straightforward in principle, but 
the disputes over Kinzie’s Addition suggest its application in practice to be 
anything but easy. 
The first recorded dispute was between the United States government 
and Kinzie together with his grantees. The original shoreline of Kinzie’s 
Addition (shown in Figures 2 and 3 above) ran due south, forming a right 
angle when the north pier extended the Chicago River into the lake on a 
 
74 On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-67019. 
75 See, e.g., Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12 Ill. 29 (1850); Lovingston v. Cnty. of St. Clair, 64 Ill. 56 
(1872), aff’d, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874). 
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straighter line to the east (shown in Figure 4 above) than had been the case 
originally. The accretion, however, ran roughly on a diagonal line between 
the arms of this right angle (see Figure 4). Who then was the relevant 
riparian owner entitled to the new land—the private owners of land on the 
north–south arm or the federal government (as custodian of the pier) on the 
east–west arm? In 1850, the U.S. Attorney General gave a legal opinion 
that the United States, as the entity that had constructed and maintained the 
north pier, was entitled to claim the accretion as newly formed government 
land.76 This legal reasoning seems doubtful: it was far from clear at the time 
that the United States retained title to the submerged land on which the pier 
was built (and indeed later, when the equal footing doctrine was extended 
to the Great Lakes, the courts established that the State of Illinois was the 
owner of the submerged land77). No attempt was made by federal 
authorities in the aftermath of this opinion to assert control over the 
accreted lands. And no court ever endorsed the Attorney General’s theory.78 
Although accretion was well underway by 1850, it was some time 
before the first reported judicial controversy over rights to the new land 
appeared. The explanation may be that the accreted lands—which were 
nicknamed “the Sands”—became Chicago’s premier vice district.79 The 
Chicago Tribune described the area as “the vilest and most dangerous place 
in Chicago,” “the resort and hiding place of all sorts of criminals, [where] 
the most wretched and degraded women and their miserable pimps[] 
congregated.”80 Before owners of lots in Kinzie’s Addition could consider 
developing the new land, these inhabitants had to be removed. On April 20, 
1857, after years of failed attempts, the deputy sheriff and thirty policemen, 
led by Mayor “Long John” Wentworth, delivered writs of ejection and tore 
down nine makeshift buildings.81 
 
76 See Accretion at the Mouth of the Chicago River, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 264 (1850). 
77 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 833. 
78 Which is not to say the federal rights theory went away. Much later, after controversies erupted 
over claims filed with federal authorities for private patents to additional reclaimed land in the area, the 
1850 opinion was “the subject of grave comment and argument” among federal officials. Brown, supra 
note 60, at 10. 
79 See LIBBY HILL, THE CHICAGO RIVER: A NATURAL AND UNNATURAL HISTORY 80 (2000) 
(describing the “notorious reputation” of the area). 
80 The Dens in the Sands Broken Up: Nine Buildings Torn Down and Six Burned, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 
21, 1857, at 1. 
81 See id. The details of exactly how Wentworth carried out this raid are disputed. See JOHN J. 
FLINN & JOHN E. WILKIE, HISTORY OF THE CHICAGO POLICE: FROM THE SETTLEMENT OF THE 
COMMUNITY TO THE PRESENT TIME 82 (Chicago, Police Book Fund 1887) (explaining that “[i]t would 
be impossible to extract from the variety of accounts one that would stand the test of investigation” and 
concluding that the Chicago Tribune article, cited here in note 80, is the most accurate). Urban legend 
has it that Mayor Wentworth arranged a dogfight or horse race outside of the City in order to lure the 
male population away from the Sands on the day of the raid. See id. at 83; Kendall, The Sands, CHI. 
CRIME SCENES PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2008, 11:13 PM), http://chicagocrimescenes.blogspot.com/2008/12/
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FIGURE 5: 1853 BIRD’S EYE VIEW OF CHICAGO82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whether or not the Wentworth raid put an end to vice in the area, 
enough respectability was established to convince owners with land titles in 
Kinzie’s Addition to begin attending to the development potential of the 
land. The Ogden and McCormick families, owners of land in Kinzie’s 
Addition just north of the Chicago River, formed an entity called the 
Chicago Dock and Canal Company, which obtained a special charter from 
the State in 1857.83 The charter broadly authorized the company to 
construct on its own lands “and on the shore and in the navigable waters of 
Lake Michigan” various wharfs and docks “for the safety and 
accommodation of boats and vessels.”84 The firm eventually filled in the 
area north of the north pier, for a distance of a half-mile farther east into the 
lake, where it constructed a long slip parallel to the river called the 
Michigan Canal. (This still exists today, being known as the “Ogden 
Slip.”85) Like the extensive landfills of the Illinois Central south of the 
river, this massive landfill could arguably be justified under the wharfing-
out privilege, on the ground that it was necessary to create the new slip and 
 
sands.html. While no official report has ever confirmed this account, Mayor Wentworth “never denied 
that the story was well founded.” FLINN & WILKIE, supra, at 83. 
82 On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-38871 (showing, to the right of the river, Sand 
Street, later renamed St. Clair Street, running north and south nearest Lake Michigan). Cf. infra Figure 
6 (also showing Sand Street). 
83 See 1857 Ill. Laws 499. 
84 Id. § 4. 
85 See MAYER, supra note 67, at 10–12. 
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associated docking facilities. The new canal and wharf unquestionably 
accelerated the accretion occurring farther to the north.86 
FIGURE 6: ILLUSTRATION FROM BANKS V. OGDEN (1864)87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 See REPORT OF THE SUBMERGED AND SHORE LANDS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE, 
H.R. 47th Sess., vol. 2, at 201–05 (Ill. 1911). 
87 Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57, 59 (1864). 
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Soon, various owners began investing in litigation to secure title to the 
new land formed by the accretion. At least seven controversies involving 
claims of accretion in “the Sands” are memorialized in published appellate 
opinions starting in the 1850s, including four opinions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. One dispute arose from the fact that Water Street ran at an angle, 
making it difficult to identify which lot was entitled to the alluvial 
formations.88 Another sprang up when the straightening of the Chicago 
River relocated some lots originally in Kinzie’s Addition to the south side 
of the river.89 Others were created by Robert Kinzie’s 1842 bankruptcy: 
some of his creditors claimed that they were entitled to seize, as part of the 
debtor’s estate, accreted lands that formed after the bankruptcy.90 Even 
further problems were created when Robert Kinzie’s widow claimed dower 
rights in lands that formed after his death.91 
The most consequential dispute, in terms of future conflicts, concerned 
the legal significance of Sand Street, standing between the original 
subdivision and much of the newly formed land to the east (see Figure 6). 
If Kinzie had made a statutory dedication of the street, then under Illinois 
law the City of Chicago would hold fee simple title to the street, making 
the City the riparian owner entitled to all the newly formed land to the 
east.92 But Kinzie’s assignees argued, and the courts agreed, that Kinzie’s 
recordation of the subdivision occurred before Illinois had established its 
procedure for statutory dedications.93 Consequently, Sand Street was a 
common law dedication, which meant the public had only an easement in 
the street.94 The fee remained with the dedicator, Kinzie, and passed to his 
assignees.95 This meant that owners of land on Sand (St. Clair) Street could 
claim, as riparian owners, title to accretions that formed to the east. 
Litigation over accretions in Kinzie’s Addition persisted until 1879. 
Cumulatively, the decisions reveal a distinct preference for private 
ownership of accreted lands, perhaps because commercial development 
was assumed to be the preferred use for the land in question. The initial 
cases assume that the accretion was not the intended consequence of any 
deliberate human intervention. The last reported opinion, however, notes in 
passing that the accretions had created a half mile of new land, “partly by 
 
88 See Jones v. Johnston, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 150 (1855); Johnston v. Jones, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 209 
(1861). 
89 See Bates v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 66 U.S. (1 Black) 204 (1861). 
90 See Kinzie v. Winston, 14 F. Cas. 649 (Cook Cnty., Ill. Cir. Ct.) (No. 7,835), aff’d, 56 Ill. 56 
(1870). 
91 See Chi. Dock Co. v. Kinzie, 49 Ill. 289 (1868); Lombard v. Kinzie, 73 Ill. 446 (1874). 
92 On the distinction between statutory and common law dedication, see Kearney & Merrill, supra 
note 4, at 1444 n.139. 
93 See Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57, 61–63, 67–68 (1864). 
94 See id. at 68. 
95 See id. at 68–69. 
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natural causes and partly by artificial means.”96 This was an oblique 
acknowledgment that the efforts of Mother Nature had been augmented by 
the shovel. As Secretary of the Interior Cornelius Bliss observed later, the 
land had been created “at first by way of natural accretion which was 
afterwards accelerated by the building of piers into the lake and by the 
dumpage of refuse from the city.”97 
III. ONE HUNDRED SIXTY ACRES OF VACANT LAND 
In the 1880s, litigation over accretion came to an end and was replaced 
by largely extrajudicial schemes to obtain rights to the newly formed land 
east of the original Kinzie’s Addition. Although the cause of this shift in 
the mode of conflict cannot be determined with complete confidence, the 
root source, we believe, was mounting uncertainty over the legal status of 
the new land. 
One reason litigation over accretion stopped is that natural accretion 
was largely supplanted by artificial landfilling. All structures in Kinzie’s 
Addition burned to the ground in the great Chicago Fire of 1871.98 We 
know that a great quantity of rubble from the fire was dumped into the lake 
in the area, south of the river, just east of downtown Chicago.99 Although 
there is no documented evidence that rubble from structures in Kinzie’s 
Addition was likewise dumped into the lake in the area to the immediate 
east, it is probable that at least some dumping occurred here, if only to save 
the expense of carting it across the river to Lake Park. 
It is also likely that artificial fill was deliberately used to augment the 
extent of the solid land. Recall that Illinois adopted the English rule for 
determining ownership of submerged land in the early nineteenth century, 
which assigned ownership of the bed of Lake Michigan to abutting riparian 
owners. This undoubtedly emboldened some riparian owners in Kinzie’s 
Addition to fill in submerged land they thought they owned.100 After 1860, 
it appeared increasingly likely that the Illinois courts would hold that the 
 
96 Chi. Dock & Canal Co. v. Kinzie, 93 Ill. 415, 426–28 (1879). 
97 Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 458 (1898). 
98 See MAYER & WADE, supra note 73, at 108 fig.1 (map showing the area destroyed by the great 
fire of 1871). During the fire, the Sands served as a refuge for thousands of Chicagoans fleeing the 
flames of the City and carrying whatever possessions they could hold. HERMAN KOGAN & ROBERT 
CROMIE, THE GREAT FIRE: CHICAGO 1871, at 99 (1971). As the fire raged on and the heat became 
unbearable, many of those taking refuge had to take to the shallow waters. Id. 
99 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 899. 
100 As one of the lawyers for the Lincoln Park Commissioners would later remark, “This accretion 
had been in the main natural, but at various points had been undoubtedly artificially aided by the shore 
owners who (some of them at least) thought and had been advised that they were entitled to reclaim 
land from the lake without limit, save as to the risk of interfering with navigable water.” Brown, supra 
note 60, at 10. 
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State owned the submerged land under the lake.101 Under standard riparian 
rights law, this would mean that any land created by artificial dumping 
belonged to the State.102 In any event, given the mounting uncertainty about 
ownership of artificial landfill, a riparian owner would be unlikely to build 
valuable structures or make other significant improvements on such land. 
FIGURE 7: ROBINSON’S ATLAS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO (1886)103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
It is instructive to consider what the land north of the Chicago River 
and east of Pine Street (today Michigan Avenue) looked like in the 1880s, 
before the era of extrajudicial competition began. Fortunately, we have a 
source, Robinson’s Atlas of the City of Chicago, which shows—in detail, as 
seen in Figure 7—solid land, subdivision lines, and structures as of 1886. 
The atlas reveals, first, that the shoreline had moved dramatically to the 
east, relative to what was shown by the original Wall survey of 1821 or 
 
101 Cf. Fuller v. Shedd, 161 Ill. 462, 474–87, 44 N.E. 286, 290–95 (1896) (reviewing evolving 
jurisprudence from 1860 to 1896 on ownership of lakebeds). 
102 See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text. 
103 3 E. ROBINSON, ROBINSON’S ATLAS OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO plate 11 (New York 1886), 
available at http://encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/11064.html. 
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even as suggested by the accretion cases of the 1860s and 1870s. Between 
the Chicago River and Illinois Street, the map shows solid land extending 
all the way to the east end of the north pier of the river. This was the 
location of the Michigan Canal previously mentioned. At Illinois Street, the 
shoreline retreats on a straight line sharply to the west. It then proceeds on 
a diagonal line to the northwest, to Superior Street, where it straightens out 
and heads due north again to Pearson Street (beyond the margin of 
Figure 7), where it again moves west. After that, the shoreline again 
straightens out and continues in a northerly direction to Oak Street, where 
Lake Shore Drive commences at the end of Pine Street and runs along the 
shoreline. In short, an extensive landmass, later calculated to be 160 
acres,104 had been formed between the river and Pearson Street, east of the 
original boundary of Kinzie’s Addition. 
FIGURE 8: LILL’S CHICAGO BREWING FROM ROBINSON’S (1886)105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 This was the number of acres cited in a survey conducted by Interior Department officials in 
1896. See Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 457 (1898). Although the survey was 
later annulled, see infra text accompanying notes 178–82, it was conducted by professionals and 
presumably accurate. Different acreage numbers are cited in other sources. 
105 ROBINSON, supra note 103. 
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More striking yet is the dearth of buildings in this area of newly 
formed land. Even the area in Figure 7 closest to the river has surprisingly 
few commercial structures and no houses. Most of the blocks had been 
subdivided into lots, but not all. All of the area between Indiana (now 
Grand) and Ohio remained vacant of lots, as were the eastern portion of the 
area between Ontario and Erie, both sides of Huron Street, and the area 
between Chicago and Pearson, among others. Even the areas that had been 
subdivided showed few or no structures. For example, as can be seen in 
Figure 8, the area south of Chicago Avenue, now occupied by 
Northwestern University, is shown as “Lills Chicago Brewing Cos. Sub.” 
But there is only one small structure shown in the subdivision. In contrast, 
the land on Pine Street and on both sides of St. Clair was relatively full of 
structures. These areas, mostly just outside Figure 7, were, of course, part 
of the original Kinzie’s Addition: title there was secure. 
IV. THE DEESTRICT OF LAKE MICHIGAN 
In the late 1880s, rather suddenly and simultaneously, four separate 
efforts were launched to gain title to the largely vacant land east of St. Clair 
Street (as Sand Street had been renamed before the Chicago Fire). As 
Edward O. Brown, a Chicago attorney who left the best eyewitness account 
of these struggles,106 would write: 
 This large tract of land, situated in such an excellent portion of the city for 
residence property, but entirely unimproved, and for the time a mere barren 
waste, seemed to dazzle the eyes of various adventurers and speculators.  
 It seemed to them that it must be a sort of no-man’s land, teeming with 
potential wealth beyond the dreams of avarice.107 
Success would ultimately go to a group that we shall call the “St. Clair 
Street owners,” holders of property whose title traced to Kinzie’s original 
patent. We discuss their efforts in Part VI, but the story lies substantially in 
unsuccessful efforts, one of which we discuss here and the others in Part V. 
The most famous campaign—and the most persistent—was that of the 
legendary George Wellington Streeter, who is memorialized by a life-sized 
bronze statue at the intersection of Grand Avenue and McClurg Court, and 
for whom the area is now named. 
 
106 Brown came to Chicago in 1872, where he established the firm Peckham & Brown. See Walter 
Nugent, A Catholic Progressive? The Case of Judge E.O. Brown, 2 J. GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE 
ERA 5, 12–13 (2003). Later he was appointed chief attorney for the Lincoln Park Board of 
Commissioners, where he participated in suppressing the McKee scrip conspiracy and in facilitating the 
Lake Shore Drive extension on behalf of the St. Clair Street riparian owners. See id. at 12, 16–17. He 
delivered a lengthy address to the Law Club of the City of Chicago in 1902 recounting his version of 
these events, supra note 60, which is an invaluable source. Later he was elected a judge of the Superior 
Court of Cook County in 1903 and then appointed to the appellate division in 1904. See Nugent, supra, 
at 33–34. 
107 Brown, supra note 60, at 19. 
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Streeter’s career has been well documented, and we will not attempt to 
offer a comprehensive account here.108 Streeter was the quintessential 
scoundrel—profane, pugilistic, a braggart, and contemptuous of all 
authority. He was also a showman and a con artist.109 He made, as more 
than one observer noted, good newspaper copy.110 He knew enough law to 
forge legal documents and defend himself in numerous trials, often 
successfully. There is no evidence that he understood the legal intricacies 
presented by property rights in submerged land. He had, however, an 
intuitive appreciation of how the legal uncertainties associated with that 
resource afflicted others. This he exploited with great skill. 
Streeter’s story, as recounted in an autobiographical book published by 
E.G. Ballard in 1914,111 starts in the summer of 1886 when he and his 
second wife, Maria, outfitted a vessel named the Reutan to see whether it 
was fit to transport guns to rebels in Honduras.112 Returning to Chicago 
from a trial run to Milwaukee, Streeter and Maria encountered a sudden 
gale that caused the Reutan to ground on a sandbar off the shore near 
Superior Street.113 They decided to stay put, and an island soon formed 
around the boat, augmented by fill obtained from contractors.114 For years, 
Streeter and Maria continued to live on the Reutan and fill in the 
submerged land around it.115 By 1893, as Streeter later boasted in his 
autobiography, “I had filled in all of the space between my boat and the 
shore to the west and south, and much farther to the northward”—
altogether, he claimed, “a territory of one hundred and eighty-six acres.”116 
Streeter proclaimed the new land “The Deestrict of Lake Michigan,” 
asserted that it was an independent nation—or at least independent of the 
 
108 A recent retelling, which does much to sort out fact from fiction, is WAYNE KLATT, KING OF 
THE GOLD COAST: CAP’N STREETER, THE MILLIONAIRES, AND THE STORY OF LAKE SHORE DRIVE 
(2011). 
109 In 1902, shortly after he was acquitted of murder by a hung jury, Streeter starred in a one-act 
play at the Chicago Metropolitan Theater, which depicted him as an American patriot and the Chicago 
police as acting on behalf of wealthy capitalists bent on destroying the American pioneer tradition. See 
Joshua Salzmann, The Chicago Lakefront’s Last Frontier: The Turnerian Mythology of Streeterville, 
1886–1961, 9 J. ILL. HIST. 201, 210–11 (2006). In the final scene, Streeter stood on stage while a giant 
American flag unfurled overhead. Id. 
110 See, e.g., id. In later litigation with the publisher of his autobiography, see infra note 111, 
testimony was offered that a manuscript based on Streeter’s life would be a “good seller.” Affidavit of 
Oscar Doering at 2, Streeter v. Ballard, No. B3224 (Cook Cnty., Ill. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1914). 
111 EVERETT GUY BALLARD, CAPTAIN STREETER: PIONEER (1914). This book, which was based on 
interviews conducted with Streeter, is written in the first person as if it were an autobiography. See 
Kenneth F. Broomell & Harlow M. Church, Streeterville Saga, 33 J. ILL. ST. HIST. SOC’Y 153, 165 
(1940). 
112 See BALLARD, supra note 111, at 214–15. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. at 217–20. 
115 See id. at 218–19. 
116 Id. at 220. 
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State of Illinois (the claim varied)—and had himself “elected” leader of this 
new “district” by an entourage of scruffy followers.117 
FIGURE 9: STREETER’S “FORT” (1892)118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
As suggested by this tale, which was mostly false,119 Streeter initially 
claimed the land east of Kinzie’s Addition by right of original discovery 
augmented by creation. He claimed to be the one who first discovered the 
land, which had emerged from the lakebed, and the one who labored to 
extend the land into a large tract of open space. Streeter undoubtedly 
contributed to, or at least invited, further artificial filling of the submerged 
land. But there is no way he was responsible for all of it. As discussed 
above, most of the land was created by natural accretion, augmented by 
artificial filling that occurred before Streeter arrived and later by the filling 
 
117 See, e.g., Bill of Complaint of George Wellington Streeter at 8–12, Streeter v. Healy (Cook 
Cnty., Ill. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1901). 
118 On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-19835. 
119 A more plausible version, which came out in a later fraud trial, is that Streeter’s boat was 
intentionally grounded on a calm summer evening, and he was allowed to leave it on dry land by 
Nathaniel K. Fairbank, arguably the riparian owner. Streeter then overstayed his welcome and became a 
squatter. See Salzmann, supra note 109, at 207–08. 
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performed by the Lincoln Park Commissioners in building the Lake Shore 
Drive extension after 1891.120 
Later, perhaps in emulation of rival claimants, Streeter developed an 
alternative theory of title. It was based on the Wall survey of 1821, which 
had been used to establish the original Kinzie’s Addition.121 He claimed 
that the line on the map demarcating the shore of Lake Michigan was not a 
meander line but rather a boundary line.122 Meander lines were established 
by surveyors along the edge of bodies of water for purposes of ascertaining 
the quantity of land available for sale.123 They were understood to be 
subject to revision in later litigation when the exact boundary would be 
established, depending on the facts on the ground, the applicable state law 
about who owned submerged land, and where the legal line of division 
between public and private ownership was located. Boundary lines, in 
contrast, were understood to be fixed delimitations of property rights 
established by survey, as under a metes-and-bounds survey system.124 If the 
shoreline was a meander line, then Kinzie’s patent would include the right 
to claim as property subsequent accretions. If it was a boundary line, then 
the accretions would arguably be part of the public domain open for 
claiming. 
Relying on the theory that Wall’s survey had established a boundary 
line, Streeter applied in 1895 for a patent on the “unclaimed” land outside 
Kinzie’s Addition, invoking Maria’s status as the widow of a Civil War 
veteran.125 His application was rejected by the Land Office on the ground 
that the lands east of St. Clair Street “do not belong to the government, and, 
therefore, this Department has no jurisdiction to direct their survey or 
disposal.”126 
  
 
120 See id. (citing John W. Stamper, Shaping Chicago’s Shoreline, 14 CHI. HIST. 44, 51–53 (1985–
86)). 
121 See Wall Survey, supra note 60. 
122 See Bill of Complaint of George Wellington Streeter, supra note 117, at 8. 
123 See, e.g., R.R. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272 (1868); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 
(1891). 
124 On the distinction of meander lines from boundaries, see WALTER G. ROBILLARD ET AL., 
BROWN’S BOUNDARY CONTROL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES § 9.14, at 254 (6th ed. 2009). 
125 KLATT, supra note 108, at 31. Congress had granted Civil War veterans and widows certain 
homestead rights involving public lands. See generally PAUL W. GATES, PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW 
COMM’N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 281–83 (1968) (providing an overview of the 
congressional scheme and its implementation). 
126 George W. Streeter et al., 21 Pub. Lands Dec. 131, 133 (1895). 
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FIGURE 10: STREETER’S ADVERTISING MAP (CA. 1903)127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This led to Streeter’s third device for claiming the land: he and two 
collaborators secured a copy of the original Kinzie patent, used acid to 
remove the original signatures and land description, and forged the 
necessary signatures and information to make it appear that Streeter had a 
valid federal patent to the land.128 Before the forgery was exposed, Streeter 
managed to secure an abstract of title from a title company and convinced 
Rascher’s Insurance Co. to publish a map showing a portion of the area as 
“Streeter’s land.”129 
 
127 On file with the Chicago Public Library, Special Collections and Preservation Division, STR 
Box 1, Folder 43. 
128 See KLATT, supra note 108, at 70; Brown, supra note 60, at 32–33; Salzmann, supra note 109, 
at 208; True Bills for Capt. Streeter, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 1902, at 3. 
129 See KLATT, supra note 108, at 45–46. 
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As he shifted back and forth from one theory to another, Streeter 
intuitively perceived that any claim of title would be strengthened, certainly 
in a psychological if not a legal sense, if he were in actual possession of 
some part of the land. Like the seafaring explorers of the sixteenth century, 
Streeter felt that it was imperative to plant a flag in the soil marking his 
“discovery” of the contested land. This explains his dogged efforts from 
1886 to 1915 to maintain a foothold on some portion of the contested 
terrain. Whether it was the grounded Reutan, a makeshift fortress (see 
Figure 9 above), a tent, a shack, a boat club house, a broken-down 
omnibus, or a small brick building, Streeter nearly always sought to 
maintain some physical presence on the land.130 The principal exceptions 
were when he was in jail or when others in league with him maintained a 
presence on the land, allowing him to live elsewhere. 
FIGURE 11: STREETER AND “MA”131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Streeter’s efforts to maintain a foothold on the land were greatly 
assisted by the half-hearted attempts of the St. Clair Street owners to evict 
him. Nathaniel K. Fairbank, who had accumulated a fortune by processing 
lard and making soap and owned land on St. Clair between Huron and 
 
130 See Saga of Streeterville—A Forty Year Real Estate War: Picturesque Squatter’s Futile Fight, 
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 1937, at E1. 
131 On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-12593. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1088 
Superior streets, set the pattern here.132 He obtained an order of forcible 
entry and detainer against Streeter sometime after the Reutan beached but 
failed to enforce it before Streeter succeeded in tying the matter up in 
litigation.133 Periodically, one or more owners would persuade the police to 
intervene or would hire private “detectives” to attempt to evict Streeter and 
his cohorts.134 Most of these attempts were rebuffed by a show of force by 
Streeter and Maria, and later by Streeter and his fourth wife,135 “Ma” 
Streeter (pictured in Figure 11 above).136 On several occasions, Streeter was 
forced to retreat, but he always came back, by land or water. 
The most serious episode occurred in 1902, when a young guard hired 
by an attorney for the St. Clair Street owners was shot and killed in a gun 
battle with Streeter’s gang.137 Streeter was indicted for murder.138 His first 
trial, in which he defended himself, ended with a hung jury; the second 
resulted in a manslaughter conviction. After spending less than a year in the 
Joliet state penitentiary, Streeter was released by a sympathetic judge.139 
What was Streeter’s objective in all this? There are occasional 
suggestions that he wanted to make a pest of himself to the St. Clair Street 
owners, whom he called “the millionaires,” in an attempt to get them to buy 
him off.140 He was certainly a pest, but there is no indication that he ever 
extracted an offer of payment in return for forfeiting his “claim.” More 
obviously, Streeter made a living by duping unsophisticated real estate 
investors into buying deeds to lots in his District of Lake Michigan. At the 
peak of his success, before the forged deed was exposed, he sold lots out of 
 
132 See KLATT, supra note 108, at 61; Salzmann, supra note 109, at 206–07. 
133 See Fairbank v. Streeter, 142 Ill. 226, 31 N.E. 494 (1892); He Stands by the Ship, CHI. TRIB., 
Sept. 10, 1890, at 1. 
134 See KLATT, supra note 108, at 68–69; K.C. Tessendorf, Captain Streeter’s District of Lake 
Michigan, 5 CHI. HIST. 152, 157 (1976); The Fall of Streeterville: The Wounded, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 
1915, at 2. The “hired tools,” it was said, would stand watch around the clock and, taking advantage of 
Streeter’s inability to guard each of his two habitations and boathouse simultaneously, would routinely 
cast possessions, such as Streeter’s piano and furniture, from the property at times of Streeter’s absence. 
BALLARD, supra note 111, at 232–35. 
135 There is significant confusion about Streeter’s various marriages and their status. KLATT, supra 
note 108, seems to have sorted most of it out. Streeter’s first wife, Minnie, ran away to join a vaudeville 
troop, likely without obtaining a divorce. See id. at 38. His second wife, Maria, died of injuries 
sustained in falling off a streetcar in 1903. See id. at 102. He was then married for about one month to a 
young girl of fifteen or sixteen named Mary Collins, who evidently believed Streeter’s claim that his 
land was worth millions. See id. at 103. She left him without seeking a divorce. Id. at 104. He then 
married Elma, or “Ma.” See id. at 38. 
136 See ‘Ma’ Streeter Fights On as the ‘Cap’n’ Dies, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 1921, at 3. None of 
Streeter’s partners shied away from battle. For example, during a forceful attempt to oust Streeter and 
Maria from their lakefront home, she poured a pot of boiling water on five intruders, ending the battle. 
See id. 
137 See District Battle Ends in Murder, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1902, at 1. 
138 See id.; Lay Murder to Streeter, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 1902, at 1. 
139 See KLATT, supra note 108, at 101–03. 
140 See Salzmann, supra note 109, at 207–08. 
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a parlor in the Tremont Hotel.141 One newspaper estimated that he had 
received $100,000 in his nearly thirty-year career of engaging in sham land 
transactions.142 
There are two striking facts about Streeter’s marathon career as a 
squatter. First, there is no publicly reported judicial decision holding him 
guilty of trespass. We know of at least two forcible entry and detainer 
actions—a statutory cause of action that presupposes the defendant to be in 
wrongful possession—brought by St. Clair owners against Streeter. The 
first, filed by Fairbank in 1890, resulted in a victory for Fairbank in the 
local justice court but was reversed on appeal by the Cook County Superior 
Court, where Streeter raised the defense that Fairbank’s riparian rights 
included only natural accretion and not artificial landfilling.143 Fairbank 
eventually got the original judgment reinstated by the Illinois Supreme 
Court, but on the hypertechnicality that the wrong judge had set the appeal 
bond.144 The second was filed in 1901 by Louisa Healy, the widow of 
portrait artist George Healy, who claimed an interest in land between 
Pearson and Walton streets.145 This resulted in an elaborate trial and a 
victory for Healy in the superior court, but the decision rested heavily on 
the determination that Streeter had been present on the land less than one 
year.146 There was no appeal. There were numerous other legal actions 
against, and sometimes by, Streeter, but they involved ancillary issues such 
as fraud, assault, murder, or selling liquor on Sundays.147 None of these 
proceedings brought the title of the St. Clair Street owners into question. 
It is probably no coincidence that the St. Clair owners avoided a 
definitive judicial determination of their title in the long-running battle with 
Streeter. Fear of popular sympathy for the wily scoundrel may have been 
one reason. But a more likely explanation is that their title was doubtful—
at least over much of the land in question. Streeter was correct in his 
defense against Fairbank, although he did not have a complete command of 
all the authorities that would confirm he was right. If the artificial filling of 
submerged land to which the State of Illinois had never given its consent 
had formed the ground that Streeter was occupying, then the State was the 
only authority that could evict him, not the St. Clair owners.148 
 
141 See id. at 207. 
142 See Chicago’s ‘Oasis’ Raided by Police, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1915, at 8. 
143 See He Is a Modern Crusoe, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 1891, at 9. 
144 See Fairbank v. Streeter, 142 Ill. 226, 31 N.E. 494 (1892). 
145 See Healy v. Streeter, No. 217933 (Cook Cnty., Ill. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 1901). 
146 See id. 
147 See KLATT, supra note 108, at 94 (fraud trial); id. at 100 (assault); id. at 99–102 (murder); id. at 
115 (selling liquor on Sunday). 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 98–100 (describing the artificial filling that followed the 
Chicago Fire). 
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The second striking fact about Streeter’s long career is that the State of 
Illinois showed no interest in his agitation. This was so even though it 
became increasingly clear that the State held title to the submerged land out 
of which Streeter’s “island” and the associated landfilling had allegedly 
emerged. Streeter had his run-ins with the Chicago police, and he fought 
pitched battles with private security guards hired by the St. Clair Street 
owners. But the State of Illinois was entirely absent from the scene. This 
underscores the weakness of the State as an institution at the time. The 
emerging legal consensus that the State owned the land sounded nice in 
theory, but in practice it was little different from saying that it was owned 
by no one at all. 
V. THE MCKEE SCRIP AND POTAWATOMI CLAIMS 
Captain Streeter was not the only one maneuvering to obtain property 
rights in the vacant land east of Kinzie’s Addition. Other, more 
professional attempts—one involving veterans’ rights and the other an 
Indian tribe—were afoot as well. Because they were more professional, 
they were more threatening to the St. Clair Street owners. 
A. The McKee Scrip Claim 
William R. McKee, a colonel with the Second Regiment Kentucky 
Volunteers, was killed in action during the Battle of Buena Vista in the 
War with Mexico.149 In 1853, Congress enacted a private bill awarding each 
of his orphaned children a quarter section of land “to be located upon any 
vacant land of the United States.”150 As frequently happened in such cases, 
the McKee children sold their rights for cash.151 The McKee scrip, as it was 
called, eventually came into the hands of a group of adventurers led by 
Harvey M. LaFollette and Mathias Benner; they set their sights on using it 
to acquire the land east of the original Kinzie’s Addition.152 
In 1896, the General Land Office rejected their initial application 
seeking a patent to the land as “vacant land of the United States.”153 Later 
that year, a new Commissioner of the Land Office, Silas W. Lamoreaux, 
was appointed. Lamoreaux proved to be much more accommodating. 
Indeed, as events would reveal, he almost certainly engaged in corrupt 
collusion with the LaFollette group.154 
 
149 See WILLIAM E. RAILEY, HISTORY OF WOODFORD COUNTY, KENTUCKY 26 (photo. reprint 
2002) (1938); To End M’Kee Scrip Case, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1896, at 11. 
150 An Act for the Relief of the Widow and Orphan Children of Colonel William R. McKee, Late 
of Lexington, Kentucky, 10 Stat. 745 (1853); To End M’Kee Scrip Case, supra note 149. 
151 See The M’kee Scrip, INTER OCEAN (Chicago), Aug. 25, 1889, at 8. 
152 See Plan to Secure Lake Front Acres, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 20, 1896, at 1. 
153 See Brown, supra note 60, at 20. 
154 See id. at 22; see also One More on Lamoreux, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1897, at 12 (describing 
preferential treatment of the LaFollette group by Lamoreaux). 
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The LaFollette group refiled its application, and Lamoreaux quickly 
responded by directing a number of clerks from his office to go to Chicago 
to conduct a survey of “unsurveyed public land” in the tract in question.155 
Fairbank, one of the St. Clair owners, got wind of the planned survey and 
filed a protest.156 This was evidently rejected, for within a month the 
LaFollette group filed an amended application, this time seeking to patent 
“Lot A of said fractional section 10, in township and range aforesaid, as 
described and shown on the plat of the official survey of such lands 
approved October 15, 1896.”157 The new survey ordered by Lamoreaux 
showed all of the lands east of St. Clair as “Lot A,” which it calculated as 
comprising 160 acres.158 Being depicted on an official survey of the Land 
Office, these lands were by implication deemed to be part of the federal 
public domain open for claiming. 
After the applicants and the St. Clair Street objectors filed further 
evidentiary affidavits, Lamoreaux signed a written opinion on February 20, 
1897, awarding a patent to the entire 160 acres to the McKee scrip 
claimants.159 Lamoreaux put the decision in a sealed envelope and left it 
with his deputy, with instructions that it was to be opened and officially 
“promulgated” the following Tuesday, February 23, after the holiday for 
Washington’s birthday.160 Lamoreaux then left Washington for a health 
spa.161 
We should note at this point that, once promulgated, decisions by the 
Commissioner of the Land Office awarding patents to federal lands were 
very difficult to reverse.162 A rival applicant could appeal to the Secretary 
of the Interior, but the established practice was that the Secretary would not 
take additional evidence and would reverse a decision only based on clear 
error appearing on the record made by the Commissioner.163 Courts were 
 
155 See Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 454 (1898). 
156 See id.; see also Brown, supra note 60, at 20 (describing how the survey was ordered without 
notice to those in possession of the land). 
157 Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 455 (1898) (emphasis added); see Brown, 
supra note 60, at 20. 
158 See Lake-Front Arguments Closed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 26, 1896, at 5. 
159 See Brown, supra note 60, at 22; Says Benner Has Won, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1897, at 1. 
160 Brown, supra note 60, at 22; May Be a Scandal, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1897, at 1. 
161 See Brown, supra note 60, at 23 (noting that Lamoreaux left Washington for White Sulphur 
Springs). 
162 See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856) 
(noting that it had been “repeatedly decided” that the resolution of claims to public lands by officers of 
the Public Land Office were “conclusive, either upon the particular facts involved . . . or upon the 
whole title”). See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and 
Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801‒1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1696–1734 (2007) 
(discussing the development of the Public Land Office and the limited role of courts in adjudicating 
public land disputes in the nineteenth century). 
163 Rule of Practice 81 provided the right to appeal to the Secretary of the Interior regarding “any 
question relating to the disposal of the public lands and to private land claims, except in case of 
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even more reluctant to intervene. Courts generally treated decisions to 
award land patents as an unreviewable matter of administrative discretion, 
except perhaps for instances of proven fraud.164 
Lamoreaux’s decision and the projected date of promulgation came in 
the waning days of President Grover Cleveland’s Administration. Part of 
the plan, evidently, was to release the decision sufficiently close to the 
turnover of administrations that it could not be easily reversed.165 It was 
also alleged, later, that the schemers planned to use photographic copies of 
the Lamoreaux opinion to sell lots to investors in Europe before any word 
of a reversal could reach them.166 The St. Clair owners nevertheless got 
wind that something was up. Being well connected, they interceded with 
President Cleveland, who directed that no action be taken to promulgate 
any decision on the McKee scrip application without his approval.167 
The nervous owners also sent an emissary to Washington to obtain 
further assurances that no action would be taken by either the outgoing 
Cleveland Administration or the incoming McKinley Administration before 
further inquiry could be made into the matter.168 Upon receiving the 
required assurances, the emissary left Washington to return to Chicago by 
train shortly after the inauguration.169 On the morning of Sunday, March 7, 
he stepped off the train in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to purchase a Chicago 
paper, where he read an article proclaiming that the LaFollette application 
had been granted, complete with extensive quotations from the Lamoreaux 
opinion.170 A flurry of panicked telegrams ensued. 
It turned out Lamoreaux had secretly given a copy of the decision to 
the LaFollette applicants, and they had leaked it to the press.171 Fortunately 
for the St. Clair owners, the official copy still sat unopened in the sealed 
envelope in Washington. 
 
interlocutory orders and decisions, and orders for hearing or other matter resting in the discretion of the 
Commissioner.” Rules of Practice, Revised, 4 Pub. Lands Dec. 35, 46 (1885). But Rule of Practice 72 
prevented parties from submitting additional evidence to the Commissioner or Secretary of the Interior 
once the contest was closed before the local land officers, unless such new evidence was offered under 
stipulation of the parties or as the basis for a new trial. See id. at 45. Furthermore, the Secretary of the 
Interior could not reverse a Commissioner’s decision once the Secretary’s predecessor had affirmed the 
decision or denied the appeal. See State of Oregon, 3 Pub. Lands Dec. 595, 596 (1885). 
164 See Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72, 81–84 (1871); Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 
533–34 (1877). Courts began offering limited review later in the nineteenth century in cases alleging 
fraud or perjury, and even later for alleged errors of law. See Mashaw, supra note 162, at 1726–27. But 
whether such review would lie in any particular case continued to be a matter of uncertainty. 
165 See Brown, supra note 60, at 23–24. 
166 See id. at 24. 
167 See id. at 23. 
168 See id. at 24–26. 
169 See id. at 26. 
170 See id. The article may have been Say Scrip Owners Win, CHI. TIMES-HERALD, Mar. 7, 1897, 
at 1, or Says Benner Has Won, supra note 159. 
171 See Brown, supra note 60, at 27; May Be a Scandal, supra note 160. 
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When the new Secretary of the Interior, Cornelius Bliss, learned of the 
premature publication of the decision, he demanded an explanation from 
Lamoreaux, who was convalescing in Wisconsin.172 Lamoreaux lamely 
confessed he had given a copy of the decision to “a party,” but with 
instructions that it was not to be released until promulgated.173 Furious 
about the irregularity, and clearly suspicious about Lamoreaux’s role in the 
affair, Bliss demanded that Lamoreaux grant an immediate rehearing on the 
application.174 Lamoreaux issued the order and was allowed to resign before 
the rehearing took place, without any further action taken against him.175 
On rehearing, Lamoreaux’s successor, Binger Hermann, rejected the 
application.176 LaFollette appealed the decision to Bliss, who affirmed in a 
published opinion, which bears the notation that it was “approved” by 
Willis Van Devanter, the future Supreme Court Justice, then serving as 
Assistant Attorney General.177 
LaFollette’s strongest contention on appeal, for which he was able to 
cite a number of Land Office precedents, was that the order for the survey 
in 1896 was a final determination that the land in question was public land 
and that the determination was res judicata and binding on the Department. 
Bliss rejected the argument, reasoning that the approval of a survey should 
not bar the Department from reexamining the question of public title “at 
any time before the legal title has passed from the United States.”178 The 
decisions cited by LaFollette, to the extent they suggested to the contrary, 
were overruled.179 
On the merits, Bliss concluded that the eastern line of north fractional 
section 10, as shown on the Wall survey of 1821, was a meander line, not a 
boundary line.180 Thus, by referring to the Wall survey in the 1837 patent 
issued to Robert A. Kinzie, the United States parted with all interest in the 
land up to the shoreline of Lake Michigan.181 All federal interest to the 
shore having been parted with, there were no federal public lands available 
to claim in the area. The survey ordered by Lamoreaux in 1896 was 
annulled because the land surveyed was not part of the public domain.182 
 
172 See Brown, supra note 60, at 27; Lamoreux Is Hit Hard, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1897, at 2. 
173 Brown, supra note 60, at 27; Scrip Report Cast Aside, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 13, 1897, at 1. 
174 See Brown, supra note 60, at 27–28; A Land Office Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1897, at 1. 
175 See Brown, supra note 60, at 28; Lamoreux’s Resignation Accepted, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 20, 1897, 
at 9. 
176 See Decision Against M’Kee Scrip Holders, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 1897, at 1; Scrip Claim 
Thrown Out, CHI. DAILY NEWS, May 26, 1897, at 1. 
177 See Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 474 (1898) (notation of approval). 
178 Id. at 464. 
179 See id. at 465. 
180 See id. at 473–74; Scrip Case Is Lost, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 1898, at 11; M’Kee Claimants Are 
Defeated, CHI. CHRON., Apr. 3, 1898, at 11. 
181 See Harvey M. La Follette et al., 26 Pub. Lands Dec. 453, 473–74 (1898). 
182 See id. at 474. 
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The opinion said nothing about who in fact was the owner of the 160 acres 
east of Kinzie’s Addition. Bliss noted only that after the original patent was 
issued to Kinzie, the United States “ceased to be a riparian proprietor and is 
therefore not entitled to subsequent accretions.”183 
The scheme did not immediately die away. Several years later, we still 
read of deeds based on the “McKee scrip” being recorded by unsuspecting 
out-of-state investors.184 The St. Clair owners scoffed at these claims, but 
the land, despite its prime location, remained largely undeveloped. 
B. The Potawatomi Claim 
A rival scheme, which drew on some of the same arguments as the 
McKee scrip claim, sought to claim the newly formed land for a band of 
the Potawatomi Indians. Before European settlers had arrived, the 
Potawatomi inhabited the area where Chicago is located.185 In the Treaty of 
Greenville of 1795, the United States promised the Potawatomi that they 
could continue to occupy this area and that their right of occupancy would 
be disturbed only if they entered into a further agreement with the United 
States disclaiming occupancy.186 In the Treaty of Chicago of 1833 and the 
follow-up Treaty of 1846, the Potawatomi agreed to relinquish their claim 
to five million acres of land in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Illinois, in return 
for cash and an equivalent number of acres west of the Mississippi.187 These 
treaties were understood to extinguish the Potawatomi’s right of 
occupancy, which was a precondition to opening the lands to sale by the 
federal government.188 No mention was made in any of these treaties of the 
submerged land beneath Lake Michigan. 
One band of the tribe, known as the Catholic Potawatomi, received 
permission to remain in the St. Joseph River Valley in southwest 
Michigan.189 In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Catholic 
Potawatomi, led by an elected business committee, pursued multiple claims 
for breaches of treaty obligations before Congress and the federal Court of 
 
183 Id. 
184 See, e.g., In Real Estate Circles, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1901, at 29; Deed Filed to Shore Land 
Held Under a Scrip Claim, CHI. TRIB., July 25, 1902, at 12. 
185 See KEATING, supra note 58, at 12–14. 
186 See Treaty of Greenville art. V, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49. 
187 See Treaty with the Chippewas, etc. arts. I–III, Sept. 26, 1833, 7 Stat. 431; Treaty with the 
Pottowautomie Nation arts. II–IV, June 5 and 17, 1846, 9 Stat. 853. 
188 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584–85 (1823); see also STUART BANNER, 
HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER 178–88 (2005) (providing 
background on the Indians’ right of occupancy). 
189 For background, see JAMES A. CLIFTON, SIMON POKAGON AND THE SAND-BAR CASE: 
MICHIGAN POTAWATOMI INDIANS SUE FOR CHICAGO’S LAKE FRONT (n.d.) [hereinafter CLIFTON, 
SIMON POKAGON]. A shorter and more accessible version of this account can be found in JAMES A. 
CLIFTON, THE POKAGONS, 1683–1983: CATHOLIC POTAWATOMI INDIANS OF THE ST. JOSEPH RIVER 
VALLEY 112–16 (1984). 
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Claims, with some success. The self-declared chief of the Catholic 
Potawatomi during this period, Simon Pokagon, was a colorful figure who 
spent more time on the lecture circuit than he did in the St. Joseph River 
Valley. His speaking career was evidently resented by other members of 
the tribe, and they deposed him from his position as chairman of the 
business committee.190 Perhaps in an effort to regain status with the band, 
Pokagon and two Chicago lawyers conceived the idea of making a claim 
for the reclaimed land along the Chicago waterfront, including 
Streeterville. The lawyers eventually lost interest in the scheme, and 
Pokagon, in desperation, “sold” by quitclaim deed the band’s interest in the 
Chicago lakefront to another schemer who had previously joined forces 
with Streeter, William H. Cox.191 
Armed with the “deed” from Pokagon, Cox filed a claim on behalf of 
the tribe with the Indian Bureau of the Department of Interior.192 The gist of 
the argument was that the Wall survey of 1821 established the shoreline of 
Lake Michigan as a boundary rather than a meander line; the Potawatomi 
had never relinquished their right of occupancy to the land east of this 
boundary; and, therefore, the Bureau should confirm the Indians’ claim to 
the land, which the United States would have to acquire by a new treaty if 
it wished to permit settlement by non-Indians.193 
The Commissioner of the Indian Bureau rejected the claim in 1900, on 
the ground that all land east of the Mississippi River that had been occupied 
by the Indians had been ceded to the United States by the treaties of 1833 
and 1846.194 Later that year, representatives of the Catholic Potawatomi 
appeared before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, with the request 
that Congress enact legislation giving them the right to sue in the Court of 
Claims to “settle the title of lands claimed by them in Lake Michigan.”195 
The committee, following the Secretary of the Interior’s recommendation, 
found that the Potawatomi had ceded all rights to the lands of Illinois.196 
Simon Pokagon died in 1899, and his son, Charles Pokagon, took up 
the “Sand-Bar Claim” as his own cause.197 Charles was, if anything, more 
melodramatic than his father. In the spring of 1901, he held a press 
conference announcing a planned “invasion” of the reclaimed land by a 
chartered steamer filled with Potawatomi braves that would embark from 
St. Joseph. Once they secured the vacant land in Streeterville, they would 
 
190 See CLIFTON, SIMON POKAGON, supra note 189, at 1–2. 
191 Id. at 2–6. Cox may have assisted in forging the patent that Streeter used to dupe investors into 
buying lots in Streeter’s “District.” Brown, supra note 60, at 36. 
192 See CLIFTON, SIMON POKAGON, supra note 189, at 6. 
193 See End of Po-ka-gon Claim, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 1900, at 5. 
194 See End of Pottawatomie Claims, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1900, at 5. 
195 Indians’ Claim to Lake Front, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 27, 1900, at 9. 
196 See End of Po-ka-gon Claim, supra note 193. 
197 CLIFTON, SIMON POKAGON, supra note 189, at 7–8. 
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fan out north and south to capture all the landfilled areas of the lakefront. 
The announced invasion generated some amused coverage in the press,198 
but never materialized.199 
Stimulated by Charles’s fervor, the Potawatomi reasserted their claim 
again before the Indian Commissioner in 1902, but he reaffirmed the 
determination reached in 1900.200 With respect to the argument that the land 
ceded in the treaties did not include “the lands under the water,” the 
Commissioner held that this was contrary to settled principles of 
international law: 
Under a long line of decisions the title to lands under navigable waters and 
islands is vested in the sovereign, and as one sovereign withdraws from a 
territory this title vests in the succeeding sovereign without any special grant. 
This operates in the United States when States are formed out of territories; 
the title to the lands under the navigable waters and the control over them 
vests in the new States without any grant or conveyance from the United 
States. 
 Therefore it is absolutely certain that the cession by the tribe under the 
treaty of 1833 conveys all of the land, and the withdrawal of the United 
[tribes] from this territory operated to vest in the United States as sovereign all 
the right and title which the united tribes had to lands under the water or in the 
waters themselves.201 
After this decision, the Potawatomi claim fell quiet for a number of years. 
VI. THE LAKESHORE DRIVE EXTENSION 
The fourth effort to gain title to the newly created lands east of 
Kinzie’s Addition was that of the St. Clair Street owners—those who 
traced their title to Kinzie’s original patent plus natural accretions. This 
effort was ultimately successful, although the statute that the owners used 
as a vehicle to secure their claims contained a substantial gap that left a 
portion of the reclaimed land unaddressed. 
Let us begin with this: Who exactly were the St. Clair Street owners? 
It is difficult to say with complete certainty, although significant 
information can be gleaned from two state government inquiries, one an 
investigation in 1893 and the other a survey in 1911.202 From south to north 
 
198 See Cash or the Tomahawk: Red Men Prepare to Collect a Bill in Chicago, CHI TRIB., Apr. 28, 
1901, at 1; Train to Fight Red Men: Citizens Bare Their Arms and Will Sell Lives Dearly, CHI. TRIB., 
Apr. 29, 1901, at 3. 
199 See Indian Invasion a Dream: Chief O’Neill Takes a Weight from Minds of Officials, CHI. 
TRIB., May 30, 1901, at 9. 
200 See Indians Have No Title to Sell, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 21, 1902, at 9. 
201 Id. 
202 See REPORT OF THE SUBMERGED AND SHORE LANDS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING 
COMMITTEE, H.R. 47th Sess., vol. 1, at 33–49 (Ill. 1911) (Chiperfield Commission); Lincoln Park 
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along St. Clair, prominent owners included the Chicago Dock and Canal 
Company, the Cyrus McCormick estate, Ogden, Sheldon & Co. (the 
William B. Ogden estate), W.C. Newberry, the Potter Palmer estate, 
Nathaniel Fairbank, and John V. Farwell. North of Chicago Avenue, the 
City of Chicago had constructed a pumping station. Farther north of 
Pearson Street, there were no St. Clair Street owners since this land had 
been beneath the waters of Lake Michigan when Kinzie’s Addition was 
laid out. 
This was a virtual Who’s Who of wealthy Chicago families, most of 
whom had augmented their wealth at least in part through real estate 
dealings. Collectively and individually, they would have had an acute 
appreciation of the potential commercial value of the reclaimed land, and 
they possessed the resources needed to advance their interests in securing 
the rights to it. 
The vehicle that the St. Clair owners used to advance their cause was 
the Lincoln Park District. The Park District was established as a separate 
government entity by state legislation in 1869.203 It was controlled by a 
board of commissioners appointed by a state court judge and, hence, was 
independent of the mayor and city council, although for state constitutional 
reasons the city council had to approve all impositions of taxes to fund the 
Park District.204 The Park District was given control over all parks 
originally controlled by the City on the north side. Subsequent legislation 
adopted in 1889 transferred to the commissioners the State’s title to 
submerged land offshore for 1200 feet, for purposes of filling to enhance 
the park.205 
The main activity of the Lincoln Park District during its early years 
was to secure land a mile or more north of Streeterville (specifically, 
between North Avenue and Diversey Avenue) along the lakefront and to 
fill and landscape this area for what would become Lincoln Park.206 The 
resulting park soon included a pleasure drive along the shore of the lake, 
called Lake Shore Drive. The original legislation gave the commissioners 
authority to extend the drive southward from North Avenue to Oak Street, 
where Pine Street (now Michigan Avenue) ended, to be paid for by special 
assessments.207 With squabbles over assessments, construction of this 
segment of the drive was not completed until 1875.208 A breakwater was 
 
Investigation, CHI. DAILY NEWS, May 13, 1893, at 4 (Bartling Committee); infra text accompanying 
notes 238–40, 282–91. 
203 See 1869 Ill. Laws 368. 
204 See I.J. BRYAN, LINCOLN PARK COMM’RS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS AND A HISTORY OF 
LINCOLN PARK 22–24 (Chicago 1899) (explaining that only directly elected officials could levy taxes). 
205 See Brown, supra note 60, at 4. 
206 See, e.g., BRYAN, supra note 204, at 34. 
207 See 1869 Ill. Laws 374, § 21. 
208 See 1 Lincoln Park Comm’rs, Official Proceedings of Lincoln Park Board: March 16, 1869 to 
March 23, 1880, at 253; Announcements, INTER-OCEAN (Chicago), Nov. 6, 1875, at 3. 
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constructed outside the drive, but it was inadequate to keep out the lake 
waters after storms. Consequently, land on both sides of the drive between 
North Avenue and Oak Street was frequently inundated with standing 
water.209 
In 1885, Potter Palmer startled the Chicago establishment by 
abandoning Prairie Street on the near south side and building an enormous 
residence on Lake Shore Drive, several blocks south of North Avenue at 
what is now Banks Street (Figure 12). Other wealthy families soon 
followed suit.210 The property owners quickly agreed to the necessary 
supplemental assessments that allowed the commissioners to improve Lake 
Shore Drive between Oak Street and North Avenue by enhancing the 
breakwater, rebuilding and paving the drive, and filling in and landscaping 
the areas in between. Property values on the drive, which enjoyed 
unobstructed views of the lake, skyrocketed.211 
FIGURE 12: PALMER MANSION212 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
209 See BRYAN, supra note 204, at 76. 
210 See PAUL GILBERT & CHARLES L. BRYSON, CHICAGO AND ITS MAKERS: A NARRATIVE OF 
EVENTS FROM THE DAY OF THE FIRST WHITE MAN TO THE INCEPTION OF THE SECOND WORLD’S FAIR 
197–98 (1929). Palmer’s mansion on Lake Shore Drive was “[b]y far the most famous, probably the 
largest, and by all odds the most imposing house in [Chicago].” THOMAS E. TALLMADGE, 
ARCHITECTURE IN OLD CHICAGO 184 (1941). 
211 Cf. BRYAN, supra note 204, at 76. After the improvements and construction of Potter Palmer’s 
mansion, “[l]and values in this neighborhood rose from $160 a front foot in 1882 to $800 in 1892.” 
3 BESSIE LOUISE PIERCE, A HISTORY OF CHICAGO: THE RISE OF A MODERN CITY 1871–1893, at 60 
(1957).  
212 Potter Palmer’s residence, formerly located north of “Streeterville” at 1350 N. Lake Shore Drive 
(formerly 100 Lake Shore Drive). On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-39490. 
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Some of the wealthy individuals and families who owned property on 
Lake Shore Drive, including Palmer, also held interests on St. Clair 
Street.213 It is fair to surmise that cordial relations developed between the 
Lake Shore Drive owners and the commissioners of Lincoln Park when the 
owners were funding the enhancements to Lake Shore Drive north of Oak 
Street. Such relations presumably made it relatively easy for the St. Clair 
owners to enlist the aid of the commissioners in helping to secure their 
interests south of Oak Street. The plan that was hatched, according to an 
early history of Lincoln Park, “was first suggested on April 27, 1886, when 
H.I. Sheldon, representing Ogden, Sheldon & Co., large owners of property 
on the lake shore south of Chicago Avenue, proposed to the commissioners 
the extension of the Lake Shore Drive south of Pearson Street.”214 The 
scheme, as refined, called for the commissioners to construct an extension 
of Lake Shore Drive that would swing east from Oak Street, sweep around 
and then turn south outside the existing accreted and landfilled area, and 
terminate at Ohio Street.215 Thus, the plan would add significant new land 
to the existing reclaimed land (which had been created by accretions and 
landfills). The extension would be paid for by special assessments imposed 
on the St. Clair Street owners.216 The commissioners, in turn, would transfer 
to the owners title to the new land between the new drive and the existing 
shoreline to the west as compensation for their assistance in funding the 
construction project.217 
The only plausible rationale for this plan was to secure title to the 
contested land for the St. Clair owners. The proposed extension of Lake 
Shore Drive was, to borrow a modern expression, a road to nowhere. The 
drive would dead end at Indiana Street (modern-day Grand Avenue), where 
it was blocked by the Michigan Canal and beyond that by the Chicago 
River. There were no structures of any consequence along the route. There 
were no existing cross streets. There would be views of the lake to the east, 
but nothing save mud, garbage, and a few squatter shacks to the west. 
Anyone out for a Sunday carriage ride would find the existing Lake Shore 
Drive north of Oak Street, and especially the section of the drive through 
Lincoln Park, infinitely more pleasant. Photographs of the respective areas 
about this time confirm this (contrast Figure 13 with Figure 14). 
  
 
213 See KLATT, supra note 108, at 61. 
214 BRYAN, supra note 204, at 90; see also 2 Lincoln Park Comm’rs, Official Proceedings of 
Lincoln Park Board: April 3, 1880 to December 16, 1890, at 213. 
215 See BRYAN, supra note 204, at 90; Will Extend the Drive, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 1891, at 1; see 
also 3 Lincoln Park Comm’rs, Official Proceedings of Lincoln Park Board: January 13, 1891 to June 
17, 1896, at 14, 91. 
216 See Will Extend the Drive, supra note 215; Live Property Owners: They Plan to Connect the 
Lincoln and South Park Systems, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1889, at 3. 
217 See Live Property Owners, supra note 216; 4 Lincoln Park Comm’rs, Official Proceedings of 
Lincoln Park Board: July 1, 1896 to April 9, 1899, at 56. 
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FIGURE 13: DESOLATE STREETERVILLE (1909) 
(LOOKING NORTHEAST TO THE LAKE)218 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 14: LINCOLN PARK (1905)219 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
218 On file with the Chicago History Museum DN-0007184 PGN. 
219 On file with the Library of Congress LC-D4-18849. 
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Once the plan was agreed upon, the commissioners sought to 
implement it under their existing authority but were blocked when the 
Illinois attorney general sued to stop construction.220 The commissioners 
then proposed legislation specifically authorizing the scheme. The bill was 
conveniently paired with another bill authorizing an extension of Lake 
Shore Drive north of Lincoln Park.221 The Illinois General Assembly 
approved it on June 4, 1889.222 The first section of the Act, speaking in 
general terms, gave any “board of park commissioners existing under the 
laws of this State” and having control over any boulevard or driveway 
bordering “any public waters in this State” the “power . . . to extend such 
boulevard or driveway . . . over and upon the bed of such public waters,” 
provided that the extension did not interfere with public navigation.223 The 
second section required the commissioners to obtain “the consent in writing 
of the owners of at least two-thirds of the frontage of all the lands . . . in 
front of which it is proposed to extend such boulevard or driveway for the 
making of such extension.”224 The riparian rights of all affected owners 
were to be purchased by the commissioners, and, failing purchase, could be 
taken by eminent domain. The third section, critical for our purposes, 
provided as follows: 
[T]he submerged lands lying between the shore of such public waters and the 
inner line of the extension of such boulevard or driveway shall be 
appropriated by the board of park commissioners to the purpose of defraying 
the cost of such extension and to that end such board of park commissioners 
are authorized to sell and convey such submerged lands in fee simpl[e] by 
deeds duly executed on its behalf by its president and under its corporate seal, 
and every deed executed in pursuance hereof shall vest a good title in the 
grantee to the premises intended to be conveyed thereby.225 
The fourth section provided that once the extension was completed, the 
new drive would become part of the Park District and subject to its 
control.226 
Although the statute called for a sale of the lands between the new 
drive and the existing shoreline, we are told in a memoir by one of the 
attorneys for the commissioners that “it was not the intention of the persons 
instrumental in securing the passage of the act that this course should be 
adopted.”227 Instead, “it was plainly the intention to come by negotiation 
 
220 See M.T. MOLONEY ET AL., BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE GOVERNOR 
OF ILLINOIS 121–22 (1895). 
221 See 1889 Ill. Laws 214. 
222 See 1889 Ill. Laws 212. 
223 Id. § 1. 
224 Id. § 2. 
225 Id. § 3. 
226 See id. § 4. 
227 Brown, supra note 60, at 12. 
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between the Commissioners and the shore owners to some agreement” in 
which the landowners would fund the construction of the drive and in 
return gain title to the filled land between the shore and the drive.228 
FIGURE 15: LAKE SHORE DRIVE EXTENSION FROM PEOPLE EX REL. MOLONEY V. KIRK (1896)229 
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229 People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 143, 45 N.E. 830, 832 (1896). 
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This close observer went on to acknowledge that “[i]t was foreseen 
that some opposition would undoubtedly develop to this scheme and that 
whatever was done, it would probably be charged that the shore owners 
were getting an undue advantage of the public.”230 But in order to “forestall 
the force of adverse criticism as far as possible,” a carefully orchestrated 
series of consultations was planned.231 First, a “selected committee” of 
eminent citizens, including Elbert Gary (of judiciary fame, as the song from 
The Music Man goes), was asked to examine the scheme and opine whether 
it was in the public interest.232 The committee did so and duly rendered the 
required judgment. Second, the Army Corps of Engineers was asked to 
examine the scheme to determine if it presented any interference regarding 
the rights of navigation.233 The chief engineer in Chicago reported to the 
War Department that he saw no objection, and proponents of the land-grab 
scheme heralded the Department’s silence as tacit approval in this regard.234 
Contracts for construction were quickly executed in 1891.235 Deeds 
granting the right to fill land between the roadway and the existing 
shoreline were made out to the landowners and placed in escrow with the 
Northern Trust Company, to be delivered when the owners complied with 
covenants requiring that they underwrite the cost of the fill and 
construction of the drive.236 The work was scheduled to be completed by 
1893.237 Nevertheless, the effort to lull the public into supporting the project 
did not succeed. Before the fill activity had gone very far, two 
investigations were launched that brought the work to a stop. 
The first investigation was undertaken by a special committee of the 
Illinois Senate, known as the Bartling Committee after its chairman. The 
committee issued a report that excoriated the project, describing it as a 
“theft from the navigable waters of Lake Michigan” that “leads nowhere 
and is valuable only to the abutting and contiguous property owners as an 
exit from the made land.”238 The committee surmised that “the property 
owners by undue influence of some sort used the Lincoln Park 
Commissioners” to advance their own interests; it estimated the value of 
the newly made land transferred to the owners to be from “8 to 12 
Millions.”239 The report concluded by recommending that “the Attorney 
 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 See id. at 13; The Lake-Shore Drive Assured, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1892, at 29. 
233 See Brown, supra note 60, at 13. 
234 See id.; Mr. Moloney Smells a Land Grab, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 1894, at 3. 
235 See Brown, supra note 60, at 14. 
236 See id. at 15; 4 Lincoln Park Comm’rs, supra note 217, at 56. 
237 See Kirk, 162 Ill. at 142, 45 N.E. at 831. 
238 REPORT OF SPECIAL SENATE COMMITTEE, 38th Gen. Assemb., at 7–8 (Ill. 1893) (Henry C. 
Bartling, chair) [hereinafter Bartling Committee Report] (on file with authors). 
239 Id. at 8. 
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General of the State of Illinois take all necessary steps to obtain possession 
of the lands created in the waters of Lake Michigan and do all in his power 
to prevent greedy owners of riparian rights from encroaching upon the 
waters of the Lake.”240 
The Illinois attorney general, Maurice Moloney, promptly launched 
his own investigation and concurred that an excessive amount of 
submerged land would be taken from the public, primarily for private 
gain.241 He announced on May 22, 1894, that he was filing suit on behalf of 
the State against the commissioners and the St. Clair Street owners.242 The 
suit demanded that the statute be declared unconstitutional, all construction 
contracts declared void and cancelled, all filling of submerged lands 
removed, and the submerged lands restored to the condition they had been 
in before any encroachments took place.243 The Chicago Title & Trust Co., 
acting on behalf of the owners, filed suit against the commissioners 
demanding that the contracts be specifically performed.244 The 
commissioners filed a cross bill asking that their title to the land be quieted 
and their right to levy special assessments on the owners to complete and 
maintain the drive be declared.245 
Moloney’s case against the Lake Shore Drive extension was 
powerfully reinforced by the then-recent decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the Illinois Central case.246 In 1869, the Illinois legislature had 
granted the submerged land south of the Chicago River, for the distance of 
one mile into the lake, to the Illinois Central for the purpose of the 
railroad’s constructing a new outer harbor. In 1873, the legislature had 
repealed the grant. The U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Justice 
Stephen Field in 1892, upheld the repeal over the railroad’s claim that it 
impaired vested rights. The Court confirmed that the State of Illinois 
owned the submerged land but said that it did not hold such lands subject to 
barter and sale, as did the United States with respect to its public lands. 
Instead, the submerged lands were held in trust for the benefit of the public. 
“The trust with which they are held,” the Court said, “is governmental and 
cannot be alienated, except in those instances . . . of parcels used in the 
improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels can be disposed of 
without detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters 
 
240 Id. at 9. 
241 See MOLONEY ET AL., supra note 220, at 122–23; He Vetoes the Drive: Atty.-Gen. Moloney to 
Fight the South Lake Shore Project, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 1894, at 3; Mr. Moloney Smells a Land Grab, 
supra note 234. 
242 See Brown, supra note 60, at 16–17; Lake Shore Case in Court, CHI. REC., May 23, 1894, at 3. 
243 See Brown, supra note 60, at 17–18. 
244 See id. at 17; Make a Forced Move: Lake Shore Property-Owners Act on Moloney’s Threats, 
CHI. TRIB., May 10, 1894, at 7. 
245 See Brown, supra note 60, at 17. 
246 Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
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remaining.”247 Moloney thus had a powerful argument that the legislature, 
in conveying some ninety-three acres of submerged land to the adjacent 
shore owners to compensate them for building the new drive, had violated 
this public trust. 
The matter came before Judge Windes, of the circuit court, who 
dismissed the attorney general’s action for want of equity. Windes 
acknowledged that title to lands under the waters of Lake Michigan was 
held by Illinois “in trust for the people for all purposes of which it may be 
used beneficially.”248 He nevertheless concluded that the legislature had 
plenary authority “to convey the fee of lands covered by waters of the lake 
to private individuals for the accomplishment of purposes beneficial to the 
people of the State.”249 
In 1896, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.250 Reflecting popular 
hostility toward the scheme, the court voiced its displeasure with the 
legislation. If the matter were a “question of policy” to be determined by 
the court, it said, “we would have no hesitation in condemning the action of 
the legislature in passing the act as unwise and detrimental to the best 
interest of the people of the State.”251 But the court wrote that the propriety 
or impropriety of the legislation was a matter for the legislature to 
determine, not for the courts: 
The legislature represents not only the State, which holds the title which at 
common law was vested in the crown, but the legislature also represents the 
public, for whose benefit the title is held, and in that capacity it possesses the 
sovereign power of parliament over the waters of the lake and the submerged 
lands covered by the waters.252 
The court found no compelling evidence that the extensive landfill would 
interfere with navigation or with fishing. And because the new drive would 
remain under the control of park commissioners for park purposes, the 
legislature had made no attempt “to relinquish its governmental powers or 
place them beyond the power of future legislation.”253 
 
247 Id. at 455–56. 
248 May Push the Drive: Judge Windes Dismisses Moloney’s North Shore Suit, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 
1895, at 9. 
249 Id. In a matter that would not be appealed further, the judge also upheld the Lincoln Park 
Commissioners’ plan to devote the land between Chicago Avenue and Pearson Street in front of the 
City’s water-pumping station for a public park, even though the City had not given its consent. The 
State was not required to compensate the City for this use of the land because “[p]ublic property 
belonging to a city not appropriated, used, or needed for any purpose may be devoted by the Legislature 
to some other public purpose within the city.” Id. 
250 See People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 45 N.E. 830 (1896). 
251 Id. at 148, 45 N.E. at 834. 
252 Id. at 151, 45 N.E. at 835. 
253 Id. 
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The Kirk court also upheld the critical provision of the Act that 
allowed the submerged lands between the drive and the shore to be filled 
and transferred to private parties to fund the construction of the drive. 
Although the Act spoke of a sale of these lands, there could be no objection 
to conveying them to the adjacent shore owners, the court concluded, so 
long as the commissioners received full value for the submerged land in the 
form of improvements financed by the landowners. The court failed to 
address the obvious objection that the government did relinquish control 
with respect to the submerged lands between the drive and the shore, as 
they would fall into private hands. But the court concluded with a sentence 
that no doubt caught the eyes of the lawyers at Chicago Title & Trust Co.: 
“The right of a shore owner on Lake Michigan to fill up portions of the lake 
and thus extend his lands does not arise in this case and that question will 
not be considered.”254 
VII. THE SLOW BIRTH OF STREETERVILLE 
The St. Clair Street owners had won. Or had they? One of the puzzles 
of the history of Streeterville is that development of the area failed to take 
off after the Illinois Supreme Court blessed the Lake Shore Drive extension 
in 1896, including the transfer of ninety-three acres of new landfill to the 
St. Clair Street owners. The drive was eventually completed, even if not 
until sometime after 1902.255 A railroad poster depicting the lakefront, 
published in that year, shows the area as devoid of any buildings whatever. 
FIGURE 16: BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF CHICAGO LAKEFRONT (1902)256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
254 Id. at 157, 45 N.E. at 837. 
255 The segment of the drive that swung east into the lake from Oak Street was the last to be 
completed. The commissioners had agreed to fund this segment themselves, and it proved to be more 
expensive than contemplated. The contractor also made an error that resulted in the reclamation of more 
land in this area than the plan contemplated, which generated more fodder for the legislative and 
judicial investigations. See KLATT, supra note 108, at 62. 
256 On file with the Library of Congress g4104c pm020210, available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/
g4104c.pm020210. Streeterville is the area north of the river and along the lake.  
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To be sure, once the drive was completed, new buildings eventually 
followed. But the pace of development was exceedingly slow, especially 
given the prime location of the land. In 1912, a ten-story cooperative 
apartment building went up on Oak Street, on landfill created by the 
commissioners, where the new drive turned south.257 In 1916, a new factory 
was constructed at the foot of Ohio Street.258 The Drake Hotel graced the 
corner of Michigan Avenue and Oak Street starting in 1920, although this 
was at least partially on land included in original section 3.259 Several other 
apartment buildings along Oak Street east of Michigan Avenue, again on 
landfill created to build the drive, followed. In 1923, the east side of the 
American Furniture Mart, now 680 North Lake Shore Drive, went up, 
again on new landfill (the west side with the tower was completed in 
1926).260 Strikingly, however, an aerial photograph of the area taken in 
1925—nearly three decades after the Kirk decision—reveals that there were 
still relatively few buildings of any substance in the area. (See Figure 17.) 
An armory had been constructed on the land east of the City’s water tower 
pumping station.261 But the land where Northwestern University would 
locate its downtown campus remained vacant, until the groundbreaking for 
Ward Hall, Wieboldt Hall, and Levy Mayer Hall occurred in 1926.262 
FIGURE 17: CHICAGO AERIAL PHOTO (1925)263 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
257 See FRANK A. RANDALL, HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION IN 
CHICAGO 244 (1949). 
258 See KLATT, supra note 108, at 119. This was the Pelouze Building, 218–30 E. Ohio Street. See 
RANDALL, supra note 257, at 252. 
259 See RANDALL, supra note 257, at 255. 
260 See id. at 260. 
261 See id. at 262; see also Frank R. Schwengel, The New Armory of the 122nd Field Artillery in 
Chicago, 16 FIELD ARTILLERY J. 1, 1 (1926) (providing history, photographs, and details of the 
armory). 
262 See RANDALL, supra note 257, at 270. 
263 Photograph courtesy of the Newberry Library, Chicago, Midwest MS Sloan No. 3090. 
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One reason why construction proceeded so slowly is that agitation and 
litigation over ownership rights to the reclaimed land did not end with the 
decision in Kirk in 1896. Streeter lay low for several years after his release 
from prison in 1904. But by 1909 he was back on the vacant land, living in 
an abandoned omnibus and selling lots to the unsuspecting.264 In 1912, a 
sympathetic Chicago alderman arranged for Streeter to occupy the back 
end of a small brick structure on Chestnut Street, where he and Ma Streeter 
sold soda pop, liquor, and copies of his biography.265 
Streeter was bloodied in a massive attack by the Chicago police in 
1915, which was provoked, according to a recent account, because Streeter 
had insulted Mayor William Hale Thompson.266 Although Streeter got the 
worst of the encounter, he was charged with assault. Defending himself 
once again, he was acquitted by the jury.267 Chicago Title & Trust Co. 
finally obtained an order to demolish the Streeters’ makeshift store in 1918, 
whereupon the couple retired to a boathouse in Indiana Harbor.268 
Streeter died in 1921. His funeral was attended by Mayor Thompson, 
who led a forty-car motorcade to Graceland Cemetery, final resting place 
of the Chicago elite.269 The president of Chicago Title & Trust Co., who no 
doubt had mixed feelings about the event, wrote a short eulogy printed in 
the Chicago Tribune: 
 The Cap’n’s ideas of law were somewhat at variance with that of the 
preponderant legal opinion but he was a gallant and able protagonist 
nevertheless. We shall miss him more than might be imagined. He kept two 
lawyers and one vice president busy for twenty-one years . . . may he rest in 
peace and find his lost “deestrict” in some fairer land where the courts cease 
from troubling and title companies are at rest.270 
Streeter may have found lasting peace, but the title company did not. 
Ma Streeter continued the quest for vindication, filing a lawsuit in Cook 
County Circuit Court in 1924 seeking $100 million in damages from the St. 
Clair property owners, the Lincoln Park Commissioners, and Chicago Title 
& Trust Co.271 The suit was dismissed without prejudice and later dropped. 
Ma was back with a similar claim in federal court in 1925, but lost when 
the judge ruled she had not been properly married to Streeter—he had 
 
264 See KLATT, supra note 108, at 107–08. 
265 See id. at 111–12. 
266 See id. at 115–16. 
267 See id. at 116–17; ‘Cap’ Streeter Turns Lawyer in Own Behalf: Avoids Fireworks and Makes a 
Plea for “Justice” When His Attorney Is Ruled Out, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1916, at 17. 
268 See KLATT, supra note 108, at 117–19. 
269 See id. at 120–21. 
270 Id. at 122 (alteration in original). 
271 See “Ma” Streeter Sues for Cool $100,000,000, CHI. TRIB., May 27, 1924, at 13; ‘Ma’ Streeter 
Fights for Chicago Lands: Takes Up Battle of Shooting ‘Cap’n’ and Sues 1,500 Persons for 
$1,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1924, at 23. 
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failed to terminate at least one previous marriage—and so she did not 
inherit any of his “right.”272 
Meanwhile the Potawatomi claim, after lying dormant for several 
years, sprang back to life in 1909. The occasion was a proposal for state 
legislation that would permit the Illinois Steel Company to engage in 
extensive landfilling to enlarge its plant site on Lake Michigan near the 
Calumet River, some ten miles to the south of Streeterville.273 William 
H. Cox and William E. Johnson submitted a protest on behalf of the 
Potawatomi to the Illinois legislature, claiming that the tribe still owned the 
submerged land.274 The argument fell on deaf ears, and the transfer of land 
to the steel company was approved on June 15, 1909.275 Later that year, 
plans for constructing a massive new public pier into the lake at Grand 
Avenue were unveiled. The Indians’ claim was again raised as a potential 
complicating factor.276 An investigative body, the Chiperfield Commission, 
determined that the Chicago lakefront was securely under the State’s 
dominion.277 In 1914, after four years of planning, the construction of 
Municipal Pier, soon to be renamed Navy Pier, was underway.278 
In a final effort to vindicate the Potawatomi claim, the tribal band’s 
business committee persuaded two Chicago lawyers to test the claim in 
litigation. The end came swiftly. The U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois dismissed a complaint filed by the Potawatomi, finding 
that “the Indians cannot claim land which they abandoned eighty years 
ago.”279 In 1917, the Supreme Court affirmed in a terse decision.280 Justice 
James C. McReynolds saw no need to construe the treaties or determine the 
original rights of the Potawatomi to the submerged lands: 
If in any view [the Potawatomi] ever held possession of the property here in 
question we know historically that this was abandoned long ago and that for 
 
272 Judge Rules Against “Ma” Streeter’s Claims, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21, 1925, at 1; “Ma” Streeter 
Denied Title to the “Deestrict,” CHI. EVENING POST, Apr. 21, 1925, at 9. 
273 See COMM. ON PARKS & BOULEVARDS, AMENDMENTS TO SENATE–NO. 284, S. 46-284 (Ill. 
1909). 
274 Cox and Johnson submitted the protest on behalf of the Pokagon Tribal Government of the 
Potawatomi Indians of Michigan and Indiana. See PROTEST AGAINST SENATE BILL NO. 284, AS BEING 
INTRODUCED IN THE ILLINOIS SENATE, S. 46-284, at 1–4 (Ill. 1909). 
275 See S.B. 284, 46th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 1909) (approving sale to the Illinois Steel Co.); Sale to 
Illinois Steel Company, 1909 Ill. Laws 434. 
276 See Ignores Indians’ Claim to Shore: Secretary Dickinson Says Pier Permit Does Not Involve 
Title to Land, CHI. TRIB., May 27, 1909, at 9. 
277 See REPORT OF THE SUBMERGED AND SHORE LANDS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING 
COMMITTEE, H.R. 47th Sess., vol. 1, at 17 (Ill. 1911); see also infra text accompanying notes 282–91. 
278 See DOUGLAS BUKOWSKI, NAVY PIER: A CHICAGO LANDMARK 20 (1996). 
279 Indians’ Suit for Strip on Lake Front Rejected, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 1914, at 14. 
280 See Williams v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 434 (1917). 
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more than a half century it has not even pretended to occupy either the shores 
or waters of Lake Michigan within the confines of Illinois.281 
After decades of agitation in multiple forums, the claim advanced on behalf 
of the Potawatomi was rejected on a simple theory of abandonment. 
In short, the period from 1909 to 1924 witnessed continued 
contestation, including litigation, over ownership of the vacant lands 
between St. Clair Street and the new Lake Shore Drive extension. Although 
in hindsight none of the protests or lawsuits posed a particularly serious 
threat to the interests of the St. Clair Street owners, this may not have been 
so clear at the time. Moreover, it is striking that, once again, the claims of 
the rival contestants were not resolved on the merits, with an affirmation 
that the St. Clair Street owners had title to the land. Instead, the claims of 
the rivals were disposed of on collateral grounds—such as Ma Streeter’s 
invalid marriage and the Potawatomi’s abandonment of any rights to the 
land. 
The uncertainty created by the never-ending contestation of private 
claimants was magnified by the emergence of new assertions of public 
rights in the reclaimed land. Legally speaking, the most notable call for 
public ownership and control came from a committee appointed by the 
state legislature to ascertain the extent of the State’s rights in submerged 
and shore lands, and to determine how far those rights had been “usurped 
by private individuals, corporations, and companies.”282 Called the 
Submerged and Shore Lands Legislative Investigating Committee, and 
known informally as the Chiperfield Commission, the committee produced 
a three-volume report in 1911 that called for a vigorous assertion of public 
rights in order to end “piratical encroachments for private gain.”283 In the 
best tradition of the Progressive Era, the commission argued that 
government ownership of submerged and reclaimed shore lands should be 
vigorously maintained, a new “Rivers and Lakes Commission” created to 
monitor public rights in submerged lands, and the attorney general charged 
to roll back existing private encroachments.284 The objective was not to 
preserve submerged lands in their natural state, as would become the 
animating focus of the public trust doctrine later in the century.285 Rather, it 
was to reserve land for public purposes such as a new outer harbor for 
 
281 Id. at 437. 
282 REPORT OF THE SUBMERGED AND SHORE LANDS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE, 
H.R. 47th Sess., vol. 1. at 18 (Ill. 1911). 
283 Id. at 12. 
284 Id. at 6–7. 
285 See generally James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a 
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989) (describing possible bases for the public trust 
doctrine and, incidentally, its development). 
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Chicago and to facilitate the development of “waste lands” adjacent to the 
shore.286 
Buried in the Commission’s report was an analysis, prepared by an 
attorney for the City of Chicago, of the Michigan Canal project sponsored 
by the Chicago Dock and Canal Company.287 The analysis sharply 
questioned the legality of artificial landfilling that had occurred to the north 
of the canal site and concluded that “[t]he title of the Chicago Dock and 
Canal Company, at least to the north half of this land, is not free from 
cloud. The cloud on the company’s title is the claim which might be made 
by the State of Illinois.”288 
Turning to the Lake Shore Drive extension, the commission 
condemned the project as having no evident purpose other than “that it was 
consummated to acquire title in behalf of special interests.”289 It demanded 
that the attorney general commence new litigation to determine “whether or 
not property worth millions of dollars [had been] given to private property 
owners to further augment and swell their holdings.”290 The commission 
thought it self-evident that such a giveaway of valuable submerged land by 
the park commission would be “wholly odious to the theory that the people 
are the true owners of the submerged lands of the State of Illinois, and that 
such lands are irrevocably dedicated for public purposes.”291 These 
sentiments were undoubtedly noted by the St. Clair Street owners and their 
legal advisors, and could only instill further caution in them about 
proceeding with any development in the area. 
More-specific plans were also afoot to use the reclaimed land for 
public purposes. The influential Plan of Chicago, published in 1909 by the 
Commercial Club, featured two gigantic piers jutting into the lake, one on 
each side of the downtown lakefront.292 (See Figure 18.) Daniel Burnham 
and Edward Bennett located the northern pier at Chicago Avenue—that is, 
squarely in the middle of Streeterville. Other sketches in the plan showed 
multiple docks jutting off the north pier to accommodate freight 
steamers.293 At least implicitly, Burnham’s plan contemplated that the area 
around the Lake Shore Drive extension would develop as a giant maritime 
port. 
  
 
286 See REPORT OF THE SUBMERGED AND SHORE LANDS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING 
COMMITTEE, H.R. 47th Sess., vol. 1, at 9. 
287 Id. vol. 2, at 198–206. 
288 Id. at 203. 
289 Id. at 207. 
290 Id. at 211. 
291 Id. 
292 See DANIEL H. BURNHAM & EDWARD H. BENNETT, PLAN OF CHICAGO fig.CXXXVII (Da Capo 
Press 1970) (1909). 
293 See id. at 64 fig.LXXI. 
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FIGURE 18: PLAN OF CHICAGO (1909) 
(LOOKING WEST FROM THE LAKE)294 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This was scarcely the only plan to convert the area into a port. The 
Pugh Terminal Company proposed a plan in 1908 to build three piers north 
of the Chicago River.295 The Chicago Sanitary Board released a plan in 
1910 for six piers to be built between the Chicago River and Pearson 
Street, each with a warehouse designed to accommodate four million tons 
of freight annually.296 The next year, Mayor Carter Harrison proposed a 
plan calling for twenty-five miles of docks and recreation piers in the 
area.297 Eventually, the City Council approved a plan in 1912 to build two 
piers, a 3000-feet-long one for passengers and packages and a somewhat 
shorter one for heavy freight.298 This evolved into the plan for Municipal 
Pier No. 2 (now Navy Pier), construction of which started in 1914 at the 
foot of Grand Avenue.299 The second pier never came to fruition. 
The Kirk decision, far from suppressing dreams about grand public 
plans for the lakefront in this area, could be read as encouraging them. The 
opinion reaffirmed the overriding importance of navigation on the lake and 
stated that the 1889 legislation did not relinquish the legislature’s 
governmental powers over the lake “or place them beyond the power of 
future legislation.”300 In effect, the strong public rights associated with 
submerged lands meant that a public claim on the future development of 
the lakefront in this area as a harbor facility remained a distinct possibility. 
This, too, magnified the uncertainty associated with the land, and 
 
294 On file with the Chicago History Museum ICHi-64844. 
295 See Docks in the Lake; $8,000,000 Project, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23, 1908, at 1; Bids for Chance to 
Build 3 Piers: Pugh Terminal Co. Submits Definite Plans for Work North of River Mouth, CHI. TRIB., 
July 7, 1909, at 3. 
296 See Move in Unity for Chicago Harbor, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1910, at 1. 
297 See Mayor’s Harbor Plan for 25 Miles of Docks and Recreation Piers, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 
1911, at 4. 
298 See O.K. Harbor Plan; Up to U.S., CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 1912, at 2. 
299 See BUKOWSKI, supra note 278, at 20. 
300 People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 151, 45 N.E. 830, 835 (1896). 
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undoubtedly caused those who might otherwise have initiated private 
commercial development to hesitate until the ultimate use of the area had 
been settled. 
VIII. OVERCOMING A FLAWED TITLE 
The deeper question is why these rival private and public claims 
persisted when the Kirk decision, notwithstanding its qualifying language, 
seemed to deal a decisive victory for the St. Clair Street owners. The 
ultimate reason, we believe, is that the title claims of the St. Clair Street 
owners were seriously flawed—and they were flawed in a way that the 
1889 legislation and the Kirk decision did not cure. 
Oversimplifying slightly, one can picture the question of title to the 
Streeterville land as involving three layers (or increments) of new solid 
land formed on submerged land east of Kinzie’s Addition. The first layer 
(shown in the darkest gray in Figure 19 below) consisted of ordinary 
accretion formed by the action of the counterclockwise current in Lake 
Michigan. Once it was determined that the St. Clair Street owners had 
riparian title east of St. Clair Street,301 this land rightly belonged to them 
under settled rules of title by accretion. The second layer (shown in Figure 
19 with a dotted line marked “1886” down the middle of the layer) 
consisted of artificial fill added outside the original area of accretion, 
whether by the construction of the pier that incorporated the Michigan 
Canal, or by the depositing of refuse in the lake after the fire of 1871, or by 
the use of the area as a general dump for city and contractors’ refuse, or by 
the efforts of Streeter and his followers. The construction of the pier and 
slip was arguably justified by the wharfing-out privilege. But the other 
forms of fill were not authorized, and thus the riparian owners could not 
claim them as either accretions or avulsions. Once it became clear that the 
State owned the submerged land,302 this layer of fill presumably belonged 
to the State. The third layer (east from the 1892 shoreline to the lake) 
consisted of the ninety-three acres of new land added by the Lincoln Park 
Commissioners in constructing and obtaining financial support for the Lake 
Shore Drive extension. This layer had been granted by the State to the 
Lincoln Park Commissioners, who had in turn granted much of it to the 
riparian owners, in a transaction upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in 
the Kirk case.303 To be sure, there was the nettlesome sentence in the court’s 
opinion saying that the right of the riparian owners to “fill up portions of 
the lake” was not being adjudicated in the case.304 Did this refer to artificial 
 
301 See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (discussing Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57 
(1864)). 
302 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text (discussing Kirk, 162 Ill. 138, 45 N.E. 830, and 
Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)). 
303 See supra text accompanying notes 213–54. 
304 Kirk, 162 Ill. at 157, 45 N.E. at 837. 
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filling that occurred before the Lake Shore Drive extension—that is, to 
filling in layer two? Or did it refer to the filling authorized in layer three—
in other words, was the court upholding the construction of the drive only? 
So the third layer, like the first, most likely belonged to the St. Clair Street 
owners, although the matter was hardly free from doubt. 
Figure 19 gives a sense of these layers. 
FIGURE 19: “THREE LAYERS” 
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We can be sure that more than one lawyer for the Chicago Title & 
Trust Co. puzzled over the state of title created by this three-layered cake. 
What did it mean if title to the outer layers was probably good but to the 
middle layer likely bad? Would the soundness of the outer layers rescue the 
middle? Or did the lack of good title to the middle infect and invalidate the 
outer? In retrospect, the St. Clair Street owners had failed in not securing 
language in the 1889 legislation ratifying all existing fills between the 
original shoreline of 1821 and the new Lake Shore Drive extension. In 
1889, it might have been possible to insert dexterous language in the statute 
that would have cleared everything up. But by 1893, the public outcry over 
the Lake Shore Drive “steal” meant that a legislative fix was out of the 
question.305 
Once it became clear that the 1889 legislation and Kirk did not fully 
remove the cloud on the title of the St. Clair owners, the straightforward 
solution would have been to file an action to quiet title and ask the courts to 
declare who owned Streeterville.306 Surely this was considered. But the 
judgment was evidently reached that it was too risky. As previously noted, 
after Fairbank suffered a setback during a forcible entry and detainer action 
against Streeter in 1891—when Streeter pointed out to the court that 
Fairbank did not have title to land created by artificial filling—the St. Clair 
Street owners consistently avoided any legal challenge that would require a 
judicial determination of their rights.307 
If the St. Clair owners were unwilling to risk a quiet title action, how 
were they to secure the fruits of their legal maneuvering to gain effective 
rights to the land? The only answer was to establish visible occupation of 
the land through significant development. If individuals or entities could be 
persuaded to build substantial structures on the land, especially structures 
occupied by institutions engaged in respectable activities, this would soon 
establish a collective sense that the St. Clair owners had acquired “vested 
rights” in the filled land. After a time, if someone tried to challenge the 
occupants’ title based on the unextinguished claims of the State, the  
 
305 See supra text accompanying notes 230–54. 
306 Quiet title actions had been recognized in Illinois. See, e.g., Hardin v. Jones, 86 Ill. 313, 315–16 
(1877) (stating that an action to quiet title may be brought by a party who is in possession of the land in 
controversy or claims to be the owner of land that is unimproved and unoccupied). 
307 An action for partition, which was in effect a quiet title action, was filed in Barney v. Board of 
Commissioners, 203 Ill. 397, 67 N.E. 801 (1903). The action concerned parkland at Oak Street and 
Michigan Avenue—in front of where the Drake Hotel stands today—and was brought by speculators 
who had acquired a reversion in this land at an execution sale. The litigation was a long-shot attempt to 
have the title of the Lincoln Park Commissioners declared void, converting the reversion into a fee 
simple. See id. at 398–99, 67 N.E. at 801. Needless to say, the effort failed. The action did not touch the 
area that was truly vulnerable to legal challenge, which was the “middle layer” of landfill, south of Oak 
Street, composed of artificial fill not sanctioned by the State. 
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St. Clair Street owners could claim estoppel, laches, or abandonment—and 
hope this would prevail with the courts.308 
The problem with this strategy is that it presented a kind of prisoner’s 
dilemma, as each St. Clair owner would rationally prefer that someone else 
be the first mover to risk constructing a substantial structure on the land. 
The full story of how the St. Clair Street owners overcame this prisoner’s 
dilemma will probably never be known. Nevertheless, the manner in which 
Northwestern University came to acquire a significant portion of the land in 
the 1920s provides a window into how Streeterville eventually came to be 
regarded as solid land of secure title, no different from other land in 
commercially developed sections of Chicago. 
Starting around 1913, the Northwestern professional schools located in 
the City of Chicago—law, medicine, dentistry, and commerce—all began 
looking for new quarters.309 Each of the schools preferred to stay in 
Chicago rather than move to Evanston, where the main university campus 
was located.310 The leader of the professional schools at the time was John 
Henry Wigmore, dean of the law school from 1901 to 1929.311 In 1916, 
Wigmore surveyed the deans of the various professional schools and 
reported to the university about their needs in terms of new space. As to 
location, he reported that the deans had agreed upon three criteria: south of 
Chicago Avenue, east of LaSalle Street, and west of Pine Street (Michigan 
Avenue).312 Thus, as of 1916, Wigmore and his colleagues preferred the 
North Side but were not thinking about locating in Streeterville. The 
principal difficulty (as always) was to find the money to pay for a 
substantial piece of real estate and the construction of new buildings in this 
preferred area. 
About the same time, Nathan William MacChesney, an influential 
Chicago attorney and a powerful trustee of Northwestern, proposed that the 
Northwestern professional schools build a new campus on the largely 
vacant land in Streeterville.313 In particular, MacChesney suggested that 
 
308 Something like this strategy would work for the Illinois Central Railroad when it sought to 
develop the air rights above its landfill south of the river. The Illinois Supreme Court eventually held in 
Hickey v. Illinois Central Railroad, 35 Ill. 2d 427, 220 N.E.2d 415 (1966), that although the State’s title 
to the air rights had never been extinguished, the State was estopped from challenging private 
development of the air rights by its long inaction in defending its title. See id. at 449–50, 220 N.E.2d at 
427. By the time the litigation arose, the air rights were occupied by, among other structures, the 
Prudential Insurance Company building, then the tallest building in Chicago. See id. at 445, 220 N.E.2d 
at 424. 
309 Cf. WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE 155 (1977); Letter from John H. Wigmore to 
Col. Nathan W. MacChesney 1 (June 20, 1916). 
310 See, e.g., Letter from John H. Wigmore to William A. Dyche (Feb. 5, 1919); Letter from John 
H. Wigmore to William A. Dyche (Feb. 15, 1919). 
311 See ROALFE, supra note 309, at 45–75, 179–84. 
312 See Letter from John H. Wigmore to Col. Nathan W. MacChesney 3 (June 20, 1916). 
313 See Nathan W. MacChesney, Report of Committee on Increasing Endowment (Oct. 26, 1915), 
in NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MINUTES: JULY 1, 
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Northwestern purchase the Farwell property located between Superior 
Street and Chicago Avenue and the Fairbank property located between 
Huron and Superior streets. When university officials expressed interest in 
this idea, Wigmore quickly threw his support behind the plan, silently 
dropping the condition that the land had to be west of Michigan Avenue.314 
In 1917, MacChesney and William Dyche, Northwestern’s business 
manager, negotiated options to purchase the Farwell and Fairbank 
properties.315 When World War I intervened, the options expired.316 After 
the war was over, Wigmore succeeded in getting the options renewed.317 
The board of trustees approved the acquisitions in the fall of 1919.318 
Northwestern finally acquired the Farwell property in 1920 for $999,049.319 
The university purchased the Fairbank property at the same time for 
$421,211.320 
In 1927, Northwestern purchased an additional contiguous five acres 
from the Newberry Library, thereby enlarging the Chicago campus from 
 
1915 TO JUNE 30, 1916, at 161–64; Letter from Nathan W. MacChesney to North Central Association 
(May 19, 1920). 
314 See Nathan W. MacChesney, Reminiscences of Forty Years’ Association with Dean Wigmore 
28–32 (n.d.). 
315 See Nathan William MacChesney, The Genesis and History of Northwestern University 
Downtown Campus, NW. U. ALUMNI NEWS, May 1923, at 3, 5; Kevin Leonard, The Origins of 
Northwestern University’s Chicago Campus—1915–1926, at 3, 10 (June 1, 1976) (unpublished paper, 
Northwestern University); The Romance of the City Campus of Northwestern University (document 
available in folder marked Chicago Campus 1923–1925, 1929, 1933–1938, 1941, 1943, 1945–1947 in 
MacChesney Box 2 at Northwestern University Archives). 
316 See ROALFE, supra note 309, at 155–56; HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON & PAYSON S. WILD, 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY: A HISTORY 1850–1975, at 120, 139 (1976); see also Leonard, supra note 
315, at 11 (concluding that the options likely expired because of America’s participation in the war, 
notwithstanding MacChesney’s claim decades later that he personally carried the options from 1917 to 
1919); MacChesney, supra note 315 (claiming that the options could not be exercised because of the 
war and that MacChesney and Dyche kept the options alive). 
317 See Letter from Wigmore to Dyche (Feb. 5, 1919), supra note 310; Letter from Wigmore to 
Dyche (Feb. 15, 1919), supra note 310; Leonard, supra note 315, at 12–13. 
318 See Leonard, supra note 315, at 16; see also NW. UNIV., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
FINANCIAL CAMPAIGN (1919); N.U. to Expend $4,450,000 on Campus in City, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10, 
1919, at 1; Northwestern Drive for Building Fund On, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 10, 1919, at 3. 
319 See Deed from Arthur L. Farwell & Katherine I. Farwell to Northwestern University (July 13, 
1920) [hereinafter Farwell Deed]; NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES MINUTES 1920–
21, at 6–7 (meeting of July 13, 1920). 
320 See NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES MINUTES 1920–21, at 14–17 (meeting 
of Oct. 26, 1920); see also N.W.U. Chicago Campus Bought for $1,500,000: Option Exercised on Eve 
of Expiration, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 1920, at 5 (reporting that Northwestern would “buy the Fairbanks-
Farwell nine acre tract at Chicago avenue and Lake Shore drive” for a purchase price of “about 
$1,500,000”). The university would add to this area in 1927. See N.U. Will Add to Its Campus on North 
Side, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1927, at 1 (noting purchase price of $2,000,000). 
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nine to fourteen acres.321 The Newberry property, located immediately 
south of the original purchase, on the north side of Huron Street between 
Lake Shore Drive and Fairbanks Court, cost Northwestern approximately 
$2,185,000.322 
The deeds of conveyance in both 1920 and 1927 hint at the uncertain 
state of title to this land. The grantors of the Farwell property, Arthur and 
Katherine Farwell, were the son and daughter-in-law of John V. Farwell. 
Their deed of conveyance to the university was a special warranty deed—
that is, a deed in which the grantors warranted that they had done nothing 
to impair title during their ownership (in this instance, since they had 
inherited the land from John Farwell), but did not guarantee against defects 
in title existing before they acquired the property.323 As for the Fairbank 
property, whose title Northwestern took via a “trustees’ deed,” 
Northwestern was aware of “certain objections to the title to a small portion 
of the property” and regarded it as “unwise” to obtain that portion “at the 
present time.”324 Moreover, citing “litigation pertaining to the titles in this 
neighborhood,” the board of trustees decided to seek title insurance for the 
Farwell and Fairbank properties.325 And the 1927 deed of conveyance 
(covering the Newberry property) was a quitclaim deed, which provided no 
warranty of title at all.326 Typically, special warranty deeds and quitclaim 
deeds signal potential flaws in the title, and land conveyed by these deeds 
generally commands a lower price.327 
There is an interesting clue as to how at least some of the money to 
pay for the 1920 purchases was raised. MacChesney served on the board of 
directors of an organization called the North Central Association, 
consisting mostly of real estate investors and businesses having interests in 
the area north of the Chicago River. For example, the association’s board 
included, in addition to MacChesney, representatives of the Palmer estate, 
the Ogden estate, the McCormick estate, the Farwell family, and the 
Fairbank family.328 Correspondence between the organization and 
 
321 See N.U. Will Add to Its Campus on North Side, supra note 320; Northwestern in Chicago, CHI. 
TRIB., Dec. 8, 1927, at 10; see also Deed from Newberry Library to Northwestern University (July 1, 
1927) [hereinafter Deed from Newberry Library]. 
322 See Deed from Newberry Library, supra note 321 (reflecting purchase price of $2,184,833); 
WILLIAMSON & WILD, supra note 316, at 155. By 1929, Northwestern completed Passavant Hospital on 
the Newberry property but had to stop all further construction plans for approximately thirty years, 
primarily because of the emergence of both the Great Depression and World War II. See id. 
323 See Farwell Deed, supra note 319. 
324 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES MINUTES 1920–21, at 14–17 (meeting of 
Oct. 26, 1920). 
325 Id. at 23–24 (meeting of Sept. 29, 1920). 
326 See Deed from Newberry Library, supra note 321. 
327 Cf. Waterman Hall v. Waterman, 220 Ill. 569, 574, 77 N.E. 142, 144 (1906). 
328 See Memorandum from Bertram M. Winston, N. Cent. Ass’n, to Nathan W. MacChesney et al. 
2 (Apr. 30, 1920) (listing MacChesney and the others on the letterhead). 
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MacChesney reveals that the North Central Association was actively 
engaged in soliciting its members to contribute financially to Northwestern 
to provide the funds for the purchase of the Streeterville property. A 
“bulletin” issued to “members” and “friends” stated bluntly that the 
proposed project “is of particularly great commercial value to the 
surrounding neighborhood.”329 Specifically, “[i]t will encourage to the 
South of Chicago Avenue, a high type of business development which will 
be of tremendous value to the surrounding real estate; it will also protect 
the wonderful residential section to the North from business 
encroachment.”330 
MacChesney was, to put the best face on it, working to advance the 
interests of both sides of the deal. His friends and clients among the St. 
Clair Street owners wanted a “prestige” development to enhance the 
reputation of Streeterville and legitimize it as a location for future 
development. Meanwhile, Northwestern needed a site for a new campus 
and was short of cash to pay for it. There is no evidence from the archival 
record that MacChesney specifically informed the Northwestern Board of 
Trustees that land values in Streeterville were depressed because the title 
was clouded.331 Nor is there any evidence he informed the board that 
constructing its campus in this area might help to resolve the title issue, at 
least as a matter of public perception, and hence enhance the value of the 
remaining holdings of the St. Clair Street owners with whom MacChesney 
was associated. Nor is it clear that the trustees had any explicit 
understanding that the owners would donate part of the funds that the 
university required to acquire the land, although it is plausible that there 
was at least a tacit agreement to this effect. 
Once the Farwell land was acquired in 1920, Wigmore and others 
made further efforts to raise the money for construction. Levy Mayer’s 
widow and Judge Gary provided support for a new law school, the 
cornerstone of which was laid in 1926.332 Montgomery Ward’s widow and 
daughter made major gifts that made possible the construction of the 
medical school building, also dedicated in that year.333 
After Northwestern’s Gothic-revival campus went up, development of 
Streeterville began to take off. Northwestern’s commitment to the area was 
 
329 To the Members of the North Central Association and Its Friends, N. CENT. BULL. (N. Cent. 
Ass’n, Chicago, Ill.), May 5, 1920 [hereinafter N. Cent. Ass’n]; see also Northwestern Drive for 
Building Fund On, supra note 318 (reporting that “[r]eal estate operators and those who have been 
studying the district . . . see a tremendous advance in property values as the result of the university’s 
project”). 
330 N. Cent. Ass’n, supra note 329. 
331 In his initial report to the board about locating the professional school campus north of the 
Chicago River, MacChesney had merely noted that once the Michigan Avenue bridge was completed, 
land values in the area would likely rise. See MacChesney, supra note 315, at 164. 
332 See ROALFE, supra note 309, at 157–58, 174–75. 
333 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1465 n.267.  
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not the only cause. The opening of the Michigan Avenue bridge and the 
widening (and renaming) of Michigan Avenue in 1920 made the area more 
accessible.334 And the construction of the posh Drake Hotel the same year 
lent considerable cachet to the neighborhood.335 Still, the central area of 
Streeterville remained largely vacant of buildings until Northwestern made 
its move. After 1926, commercial construction activity proceeded at a more 
rapid pace. Figure 21, reflecting our research, traces the progress of new 
building in Streeterville from 1910 to 1925 to 1938. Further development 
would be disrupted by the Great Depression and World War II—but never 
again by doubts about the validity of the legal title to the land. 
FIGURE 20: NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY CHICAGO CAMPUS (1939)336 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
334 See ELIZABETH MCNULTY, CHICAGO: THEN AND NOW 58 (2007). 
335 See The Drake, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 30, 1920, at 8; New Year’s Parties Will Mark Formal Opening 
of Drake, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 8, 1920, at 25. 
336 On file with the Northwestern University Archives. This view looks south toward the buildings 
on Chicago Avenue, including Levy Mayer Hall, and beyond Chicago Avenue to include (in the 
easternmost portion) a view of the Furniture Mart. Cf. supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
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FIGURE 21: STREETERVILLE BUILDINGS—1910, 1925, 1938 
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CONCLUSION 
Whether by luck or design, Streeterville was eventually transformed 
from submerged land into a neighborhood of Chicago regarded as 
conventional (if especially valuable) real estate. The period of 
transformation, which started in the 1830s and was fully completed only a 
century later, was marked by extraordinary competition over who would 
garner the prize of new solid land. The contestants came from all walks of 
life, from squatters armed with guns to con artists to Indian tribes to 
Chicago’s wealthiest families and their sophisticated advisors. 
The competition was made possible in significant part by legal 
uncertainty over the status of new land formed where water once stood. 
The governing rules were sufficiently unclear, and were sufficiently 
susceptible of manipulation, that few citizens had any idea who was in 
control of this resource. As a result, nothing seemed to eliminate the 
collective intuition that it was up for grabs. Neither physical invasion, nor 
armed guards, nor fences, nor street construction, nor legislation, nor court 
decisions seemed to end the competition. The only solution was for one of 
the contesting groups to seize control of the asset, engage in substantial 
development, and hang on. Solid land, at least when it has been occupied in 
a visible way, is a resource susceptible of stable control and use. Vacant 
land reclaimed from water, it would seem, is not. 
It is also noteworthy that Streeterville, which consists predominantly 
of artificial landfill protected by the public trust doctrine, is today mostly 
private property. The exceptions are the small park east of the Chicago 
pumping station, which the Lincoln Park Commissioners, seeing no private 
owner to claim the reclaimed land, decided should become a city park, and 
the beaches outside Lake Shore Drive at Oak Street and Ohio Street. The 
main reason for the dearth of public land is the weakness of the public trust 
doctrine. The trustee of the vast trove of submerged land under Lake 
Michigan was the Illinois legislature, and the Illinois Supreme Court, in the 
Kirk case, was happy to defer to the trustee about the proper disposition of 
this resource, given the vagueness of the trust. Grant Park to the south, 
which also consists of landfill protected by the public trust doctrine, was 
saved for public use by the public dedication doctrine, not the public trust 
doctrine.337 But given the repudiation of the Public Land Office survey in 
1896, Streeterville has no official survey or plat. Thus, there is no formal 
designation of public space to which the public dedication doctrine might 
attach. It would take many decades before state institutions would become 
strong enough to protect public rights along the lakeshore, without the aid 
of private rights aligned with the cause of preservation. By the time the 
 
337 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 1418–22 (summarizing the role of each doctrine in the 
context of Grant Park). 
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State of Illinois was sufficiently robust to play this role, Streeterville was 
securely held as private land. 
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